Governance

Well, it’s out. The final report of the Sydney Morning Herald’s Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport, chaired by Mr Ron Christie, was published by the Herald earlier this week.

The report follows the release of the Preliminary Report in February which I discussed in a previous post. The final report covers the same broad themes as the earlier one and draws similar conclusions, but it also takes into account the submissions received in response to the preliminary report as well as public transport developments since its release.

In addition the Inquiry team, in which I participated, has refined the original report to sharpen its focus, in particular identifying 65 key recommendations. These are available as a stand-alone summary document from the Inquiry website, along with the full report.

Obviously I can’t summarise a document of over 520 pages in a single post (even the summary recommendation report is around 40 pages). I would however like to identify four key points that are emphasised in the final report. 

The first is the fundamental importance of the nexus between public transport governance, planning and funding. We have been all too successful, as the report observes, at preparing transport plans for Sydney, but hopeless at funding or implementing them. 

I used to say that if any of the six or seven public transport plans hatched in the past two decades or so had been implemented Sydney would be better off, but Sydney’s fragmented governance arrangements mean that as time goes on I’m not so sure. The lack of adequate public transport management has meant that these plans have increasingly become a patchwork of government project announcements, irrelevant to the city and community they were meant to serve (the CBD Metro debacle is an obvious example of this). 

Mr Christie’s transmittal letter summarises the basis of this nexus, which informs the rest of the report: 

The Inquiry believes that there is nothing more important or urgent than:

• Genuine reform of the way the planning and management of public transport takes place (”governance”)
• A long-term plan which is developed with real community input and has real certainty, backed by legislation, and
• Guaranteed, dedicated funding for implementing the plan.

Without all three of these legs of what the Inquiry calls the “Iron Triangle”, confidence in the way public transport is handled in Sydney will continue to erode.

The second point is the Inquiry’s comprehensive and innovative research into community attitudes to public transport, demonstrating not only a strong willingness to pay for public transport improvements but also establishing a set of parameters for the amount that the public are prepared to pay for these improvements. As Jarrett Walker (who also participated in the Inquiry) points out here, the Inquiry also succeeded in linking this package of potential funding increases to a systematic set of short-term and long-term improvements. 

As Jarrett notes, any attempts to introduce these increases and taxes in a vacuum would be a political disaster, but carefully linking them to such a package of well-considered improvements would be much more attractive to the general public. 

The third and related point which I think is well demonstrated in the final report is how much improvement can be made to Sydney’s public transport in the short term. The report does not shy away from identifying the major infrastructure projects which Sydney needs to implement and which have been so neglected for the past 30 or 40 years, but it also recognises that much can be done to improve public transport in the next five years before any of these major projects can be completed. 

Many of these improvements, such as improving train frequencies and running times or establishing a “frequent network” of bus services are relatively straightforward and could be achieved with relatively modest funding levels. The importance of these proposals is demonstrated by the fact that they make up nearly half the report’s recommendations. 

These recommendations are also instrumental in relation to the last point from the report that I want to highlight – the importance it places on developing Sydney’s public transport as a coherent, integrated network. This is not just an abstract objective – the Inquiry has given a lot of thought to how the various transport modes should be integrated through reforms of the fares and ticketing structure, improved service frequencies (which reduces waiting times at interchanges), improvements to interchanges themselves and, above all, a complete overhaul of transport governance arrangements. 

I’ll return to other elements of the  final report in future posts, but for now I would just like to thank the fellow members of the Inquiry team and in particular Ron Christie for his leadership and vision. As to “where to from here?” in relation to the report, I think the conclusion of his transmittal letter about what the public and transport stakeholders are seeking says it all: 

They want a public transport plan which will meet their needs both now and in the future, a plan whose components can and will be implemented and a plan which they will be willing to pay for because it will happen and because it will meet their needs. 

And they want our political leaders to listen, act and lead – and above all else, show some real foresight which transcends the electoral cycles.

On today’s ABC National’s Public Interest (Sunday 2 May), Dr Paul Mees, a well-known Melbourne-based transport expert,  makes one of the most eloquent summaries of the case for a better-planned, better-managed and better-connected public transport system that I have ever heard.

While I don’t agree with everything that Dr Mees has said or published on public transport, this interview canvasses a number of critical public transport issues and on most of these his position is very similar to the conclusions drawn by the Transport Public Inquiry in its preliminary report. The interview, which can be accessed here, is well worth a listen and hopefully the ABC will public the transcript soon.

A lot has happened since the SMH Transport Inquiry released its preliminary report in February. Shortly after its release the State Government announced that it was dumping the CBD and West Metros, aspects of which were criticised in the Inquiry – though the Metro’s demise was probably due to increasingly widespread criticism which predated the Inquiry. This has left a considerable bill of about $500 million for the early stages of constructing the CBD metro and for compensation to contractors and businesses.

The Government has also released the draft Metropolitan Transport Plan and a review of the Metropolitan Strategy for public comment (a process which itself was the subject of some controversy) and indicated that it intends to integrate the two plans in some way. While the Transport Plan proposes some projects which were also advocated in the Inquiry’s preliminary report, it falls well short of the latter’s detailed analysis and ignores many of its proposals for new infrastructure and improved services. The closing date for comment on the Government’s plans has been extended until 28 May.

The Government has also launched MyZone, a partial reform of Sydney’s arcane and complex fare structure, ahead of the introduction of electronic ticketing which is now scheduled to occur in 2012. MyZone reduces the number of train and bus fare bands and introduces a limited zone arrangement, but only a weekly or daily basis. Unfortunately it fails to address one of the key failings of the current fares structure – the transfer penalty public transport users face in Sydney when they change modes (I’ll make further comments on MyZone in a future post).

Meanwhile the Transport Public Inquiry is working to complete the final version of its report which will update the preliminary report and also consider the issues raised in submissions and discussions in response to the release of the preliminary report. The Inquiry, in which I have played a small part, hopes to have this work finished within a few weeks.

In my last post I outlined the governance arrangements outlined in the interim report of the Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport which I had a small role in developing. Now I’d like to summarise the Inquiry’s proposals for better public transport in Western Sydney contained in the report’s chapter on long-term development and expansion of the network. 

First, a brief summary of some of the underlying assumptions. The interim report incorporates the basic assumptions of the State Government’s Metropolitan Strategy but with a higher population growth, resulting in a “mid-range” Sydney population of 6 million by 2041. 

Based on this figure, the report outlines two specific scenarios to encourage debate regarding Sydney’s future – a “European” scenario, which is essentially a continuation of the Government’s Metropolitan Strategy, adapted to the higher growth levels but with additional greenfield development in Western Sydney and additional consolidation across most of the city. Employment would be similarly spread across major centres. 

The alternative “East Asian” scenario has the same population targets but focuses on more employment growth in the CBD and inner city, combined with high levels of residential development concentrated along the proposed metro lines radiating from the CBD. This scenario is major departure from the Metropolitan Strategy but is the logical outcome of the government’s current commitment to the development of a metro network. 

For the purposes of developing the scenarios, the Inquiry has assumed similar constraints in both options, based on the community’s willingness to pay and the economy’s capacity to afford public transport infrastructure over the next 30 years. This amounts to a total, in current dollars, of around $36 billion. 

Based on these constraints and a range of other assumptions, a range of infrastructure projects was assumed for each scenario, as summarised in the following table. I have added an indication of which projects are located in or directly benefit Greater Western Sydney. 

Y* counted as a Western Sydney project because it services part of the region

Derived from table 2.10 in the Independent Public Inquiry interim report

The proposed public transport infrastructure to be constructed between 2014 and 2030 is also shown in the following maps of each scenario (source: Independent Public Inquiry interim report chapter 2 - click on each map to show full size):

 Some the project proposals such as the North West and South West Rail Links and the West Metro are common to both scenarios, but most of the other projects fall largely or wholly under either one or the other of the two models.  

In the above table the cost of the Western Metro has been included as a Western Sydney project in both scenarios because it services parts of the Parramatta, Auburn and Holroyd Council areas, even though the bulk of the route would be outside Western Sydney. With this qualification in mind, the European scenario assumes a much higher level of expenditure in Greater Western Sydney, reflecting the population and employment distributions which are both more dispersed than in the East Asian scenario.

Not only does the European scenario require more rail infrastructure in Western Sydney, but also greater investment in the region in light rail, busways and even motorways. If the Western Metro is discounted the difference between the two scenarios is even greater – $17.5 billion for Western Sydney projects in the European scenario as opposed to only $7.25 billion under the East Asian model. 

While the Inquiry notes that both scenarios would provide significant benefits in terms accommodating Sydney’s population growth and job shifts as well as the forecast increase in public transport trips, the importance of providing some degree of equity for the residents of Western Sydney was an important factor in the decision to favour the European scenario. To quote the interim report: 

The main difference between the scenarios would lie in their relative provisions for western and eastern Sydney and the equity of access provided. In this respect the “European” scenario would be superior. 

Because the “European” scenario’s proposed projects include an extra heavy rail crossing of the harbour, they would cater better for potential high-speed rail services from north of Sydney in the future. 

Similarly, because the “European” scenario’s proposed projects include an extension of the North West Rail line to link with the Richmond line, they would provide better access to the Richmond air force base if this were developed as an “overflow” airport for Sydney.

It is important to reiterate that these scenarios are presented for discussion only and neither necessarily reflects current government policy; for example, while the South West Rail Link has recently been re-announced by the State Government, the future of the North West link is still in limbo. What is implicit in the interim report is the real danger that if the government does proceed with prioritising the construction of an expensive metro network, no further infrastructure is likely to be provided in Western Sydney beyond the South West Rail Link and the Western Metro for many decades to come – if ever. 

Further, the considered approach to funding these improvements adopted in the report also means that their construction would have to be staged over a 30-year period, though even this rate of construction would be a considerable improvement over what has been done to date. In the short term, much would depend on the roll-out of the “Frequent Rapid” and “Frequent Local” bus services proposed as part of the Inquiry’s “Frequent Network” initiative which I will discuss in a further post.

It’s finally out – the interim report of the Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport. 

The Inquiry’s report was prepared under the guidance of Mr Ron Christie, former NSW Coordinator General for Rail and former head of the RTA, who famously got the trains (and buses) to run on time during the 2000 Olympics. The inquiry was established and resourced by the Sydney Morning Herald, but was conducted on a completely independent basis. 

I felt honoured to be part of a team of transport advisers and planners who spent four months working with Mr Christie to develop the report, based on nearly 500 public submissions, meetings with key experts, detailed research into community attitudes and financial options, team members’ professional experience and expertise and, not surprisingly, robust debate within the team itself. 

I assisted in developing the governance section of the report. I also contributed to the overall debate, especially in raising social equity issues and the importance of looking at public transport provision in outer suburban areas, but the report is really a collaborative team effort. 

The result is a document which is far more comprehensive than any other transport planning initiative for Sydney I’ve seen in over a decade and which is also much more evidence-based than most transport plans. The report has six sections, starting off with what Sydneysiders actually said to the Inquiry about their own priorities for fixing the transport system, and perhaps more importantly the outcomes of an independent survey which clearly demonstrated their desire for change and willingness to pay for these improvements. 

Based on these responses, the rest of the 450-page report is divided into chapters on the long-term development of the transport network, fixing fares, short-term improvements, funding and finance and the chapter I contributed to, “Getting it done”. The recommendations based on these chapters are divided into nine, almost self-explanatory key themes, as follows: 

1. We have tried the ‘do nothing’ option for public transport. It has failed

2. We need a complete public transport network plan—and an agency that can deliver it

3. The three-legged stool: urban form, pricing and transport

4. Public transport, not just roads

5. A single, seamless public transport network

6. Cost-effectiveness

7. Short-term urgency and continuous improvement

8. Long-term commitment, now

9. Leadership and transparency for hard choices

I won’t try to summarise the report, because that has been done within the report itself as well as by the Sydney Morning Herald and by Mr Jarrett Walker, one of the team members. I would like however to talk about the two areas I was most involved in – governance, and the identification of transport priorities in Western Sydney. 

The governance section, “Getting it done”, was described by Mr Christie at the launch as being possibly the most important chapter in the interim report. To quote from the report: 

No matter how visionary a transport plan may be, it will succeed only if it is supported by a strong management structure committed to its long-term implementation.

This management structure, or “governance” system, must be:

• Able to secure the resources required to deliver the infrastructure underpinning the plan
• Strong enough to maintain a commitment to the plan in the face of short-­term political considerations
• Able to manage the whole public transport system cohesively and with authority
• Able to obtain enough funding to deliver a high level of services, and
• Be prepared to champion public transport and other sustainable modes in the face of competing priorities and interests, such as the demands of private vehicles.

If the governance system is inadequate the public transport plan is most unlikely to be delivered. Critical infrastructure will not be built, services will be poorly integrated and the level of service provision will remain patchy and unreliable.

The governance section outlines the fragmented nature of Sydney’s current transport management. It compares this state of affairs to overseas and interstate experience, especially systems that operate successfully in places such as Perth, London, Singapore, Vancouver and Zurich. It also summarises proposals regarding governance expressed in many of the submissions received by the inquiry. 

The overwhelming conclusion is that to have any success in overcoming its current “silo” based management and ad hoc planning, Sydney must adopt a single new authority to plan, develop and manage all public transport in Sydney. This authority must be responsible for most activities relating to public transport provision, including: 

•  long-term public transport planning
• defining public transport fare structures and fare setting
• implementing integrated fares and ticketing
• specifying routes, timetables and minimum acceptable performance standards for transport operators
• contracting for the provision of these services
• providing network information
• marketing and promotion of public transport services

The governance chapter also discusses the options for creating such an authority, including reforming the current structure or creating a new tier of governance (similar to the Mayor for London and the Portland Metro Council). It recommends a third option – the creation of an independent public transport coordination authority, called Transport for Sydney (TfS).

This body would undertake all the functions outlined above. The TfS would be managed by an independent Board with members from the State, Federal and local government and persons with experience in the transport sector, business, marketing and transport advocacy. A small secretariat, answerable to the Board, would manage Sydney’s transport through the following sections: 

• Plan Process, responsible for developing and reviewing the Public Transport Network Plan for Sydney and conducting public consultations.
• Infrastructure Development, responsible for the purchase (on a contestable basis) and project management of the design, construction and delivery of public transport infrastructure, plus the specification and setting of standards for all new rolling stock.
• Operations, the core of TfS, which would be responsible for the development and sale of integrated journeys to the community and the coordinated purchase of these improved and expanded public transport services, on a contestable basis, from transport operators.
• Budget and Government, responsible for financial management, funding negotiations and TfS’s relationships with State, Commonwealth and local governments in support of the Public Transport Network Plan.

Transport for Sydney governance model (click to see full size) from the Independent Public Inquiry interim report

The report goes on to discuss the relationships the proposed authority should have with state government agencies, the federal government and councils, as well as the role of an independent customer advocate and of consultation in the plan development process.

The Inquiry has proposed that the new authority prepare an initial plan for public comment and that subsequently drafts of the plan should be released nine months before every state election, thus providing additional scrutiny of the plan and the responses of the parties and politicians in the run-up to the election. As the report states: 

This four-yearly revision process, tied to the four-yearly electoral cycle, would present a major opportunity for the public, the government, the opposition political parties and individual electoral candidates to shape the policies and priorities of the transport authority.

The plan would then be finalised and adopted within 12 months of the election and would be protected by legislation against political interference outside of the plan adoption process outlined above.

The governance model proposed in the Inquiry’s interim report represents a clear break with the Sydney’s current complex and largely dysfunctional management processes. The primary intention is to greatly improve the planning and delivery of public transport in Sydney. In doing so, the model would remove many of the detailed aspects of transport administration from political control and interference, limiting the role of politicians to setting the broad directions of transport policy through the adoption of the four-year plan.

It is likely that this aspect of the proposed changes will meet the greatest political resistance, though, ironically, politicians stand to gain from being able to put day-to-day operational problems at arms length. Whether any or, ideally, all of the major parties have the courage to adopt the Transport for Sydney model remains to be seen.

In my next post I will look at Inquiry’s proposals for better public transport in Western Sydney.

In December I was a participant in an international roundtable on peripheral cities held in Paris. This was part of a seminar organised by FALP (an acronym from the French for “Forum of Local Authorities of the Periphery”) in conjunction with the University Paris 8 at Saint Denis and the Plaine Commune, which is a regional organisation for eight municipalities of the northern periphery of Paris.

The seminar was organised in the run-up to the FALP and the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) “Peripheral Cities” second congress planned for 10-12 June 2010 in the Spanish city of Getafe. Within the framework of preparing for this conference, several seminars are being held in different countries. 

The FALP network was founded in 2003 by councils on the edges of large cities in Latin America and Europe. Today, over 150 local authorities from 22 countries participate, mainly still from Europe and Latin America, but also some from Africa and the Middle East. 

I understand I was invited to participate in the FALP Paris seminar on the basis of my work at the urban periphery through the Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (WSROC) and I believe that I am the first Australian to participate in one of these forums. 

The overall theme of the Paris seminar was “suburbs as hearts and hubs for solidarity-driven cities” (I think it loses a little in translation). As the program noted: 

Cities are at the heart and hub of the 21st century’s key social, democratic and environmental challenges. The question is whether they should all simply fit into the same mould and embrace the competitive, market-shaped rationale, at the risk of deepening social exclusion, spatial fragmentation, environmental harm and democratic deficits.

My roundtable was on the theme: “A different development model: inclusive metropolises”. The program summarised this as:

The worldwide economic and financial crisis is challenging the predominant metropolitan development model today, and its limits are becoming palpable. So it is vital to shift the paradigm and focus on building fair and balanced cities that rank human and environmental concerns above merely economic factors.

 Whilst there was general agreement that outer urban areas are bearing the brunt of economic, social and cultural change, there was less consensus about the best policy responses – for example, do we develop decentralised centres at the fringe to offer suburban residents the same sorts of services that inner-city dwellers enjoy, or do we improve connectivity from the suburbs to the centre? There was also a strong emphasis on the rights of suburban residents and the importance of social housing, which receives much more attention and support in Europe than in Australia.

I’ll post a summary of my presentation shortly. If anyone is interested in attending the peripheral cities conference in Spain in June, please post a comment here or send an email to alex@goodingdavies.com.au

Paris at the periphery - a different view

In November the 2009 State of Australian Cities Conference brought together academics, researchers, planners and many others involved in urban design and management at the University of Western Australia in Perth to discuss the current status and direction of our cities.

After opening addresses by the WA minister for planning and the shadow minister for regional development, over 120 papers were presented across six themes: Economy, Environmental, Governance, Health, Infrastructure and Social. The presentations were diverse and occasionally controversial, but taken together they present a fascinating and detailed snapshot of the shape or cities are in.

My paper was titled: How the west was lost – the causes and consequences of under-investment in Western Sydney’s infrastructure and was, not surprisingly, in the infrastructure stream. It highlighted how unlike other Australian and overseas cities, Sydney had failed to reverse the post-war pattern of under-investment in rail infrastructure to deal with continued population growth, particularly in Western Sydney, whilst making significant expenditure in motorways.

The paper also discussed how factors such as the pattern of development of Sydney’s infrastructure prior to the 1950s, its post-war pattern of growth, the current political and economic environment and continuing resistance in some quarters to investment in public transport had contributed to this situation, as well as the potential consequences for Sydney’s future. A copy of the paper can be downloaded here and other conference papers should be available online shortly.

Perth skyline across the river

In October I was fortunate to have the opportunity to address 150 local government officials in Beijing on the theme of building good governance at the local government level.

The attendees were staff of the Beijing Municipal Commissions for Development and reform. This meant that they had a wide range of backgrounds in areas such as policy development, local government reform, project management, performance monitoring and anti-corruption activities.

The conference room before the presentation ....

 At short notice I ended up presenting for four days straight, as my co-presenter had to withdraw at the last minute. It was an exhausting but fascinating experience; the presentations were demanding, especially as for the most part I was lecturing through an interpreter, non-simultaneously, with only limited opportunities for workshop sessions or questions.

When the questions did come they were very broad-ranging, covering areas from exactly how did the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption catch corrupt local government officials, through to the impacts of the implementation of the Rudd Government’s code of ministerial conduct. Needless to say I was fortunate to have access to the internet in my accommodation to follow up on some of these queries!

The people I met seemed genuinely committed to achieving good governance and at least appeared receptive to the central message of my presentation – that in Australia, good governance and high ethical standards are the result of strong and independent public institutions, a free press and strong community input and expectations.

Thanks to the Trans Asian Education and Culture Association for arranging the presentation and for the care they took of me throughout the trip.

and during - things were kept very neat!

The former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone’s recent City of Sydney CityTalk address contained a strong argument for greater investment in education, infrastructure and sustainable transport to tackle climate change, but he made another  important comment on city management  in the Q&A session afterwards. As a result it did not appear in the published version of his talk and has therefore not received the attention it deserves. 

Livingstone was musing how his position as a popularly elected mayor contributed to his sweeping reforms of planning, public transport and other areas of service delivery in the UK capital. He noted that the extensive powers devolved by the UK government  in setting up the position certainly helped, but another key factor was the way in which the position had been structured. 

He observed that as a member of the British Labour Party he had spent most of his political life making deals “inside the building” as he put it, within the party room and caucus, both inevitable features of the Westminster system and very similar to their counterparts at the state and federal levels in Australia. 

Livingstone pointed out that the reinstated and radically reformed position – in effect the creation of a directly elected executive mayor – had forced him to look “outside the building” for the first time. 

He had been required to negotiate and build alliances directly with organisations and structures that were not necessarily part of the political system, as well as with the wider community, to build support for his policies. Livingstone concluded that this aspect of accountability contributed to making a directly-elected mayor an ideal city manager. 

The initial reaction among many in the audience after his address was admiration for the results Livingstone had achieved mixed with an almost-universal attitude of “obviously it’ll never happen here”. This is due to the remote prospect of any Australian state government creating a directly-elected metropolitan-wide position that could be seen as a competitor. 

However, Livingstone’s perspective is still food for thought. With the partial experience of Brisbane, no major Australian city has a single entity, elected or not, with sole responsibility for city management, in particular around key planning and transport issues. Most of the key decisions are still made not only within state governments, but firmly “inside the building”. 

The apparent success of Livingstone’s London “experiment” should make state governments and councils in Australia look outside their own buildings a bit more, to reassess their perspectives on urban management and consider experimenting with different forms of more direct and accountable metropolitan governance.

In December 2008 the NSW Transport Data Centre (TDC) released Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, which detailed employment and commuting statistics for Sydney’s 33 largest employment centres based on the Metropolitan Strategy centres hierarchy. This came out around the same time as the research conducted by the University of Western Sydney (UWS) Urban Research Centre in developing the Western Sydney employment strategies for WSROC. These studies complement each other and deserve further attention.

The TDC report notes that in 2006 there were 1,923,900 people employed in the Sydney statistical division (SD) in 2006, with 716,500 jobs (37%) located in the 33 centres. Between 2001 and 2006, 71,350 new jobs were created in Sydney, with 26,600 (37%) of these jobs in centres. The report also notes that employment growth was much higher between 1996 and 2001 than in the 2001 to 2006 period. Between 1996 and 2001 employment in centres grew by 13% and across the Sydney SD by 9%, whilst between 2001 and 2006 employment slowed to a growth rate of 4% for both employment centres and the Sydney SD.

Whilst the TDC report provides a great overview, further analysis based on centre locations shows that there are strong regional variations. In this post I will start with a snapshot of employment in 2006. Before we start, a word of warning: the following figures which have been derived from this TDC report should be viewed with some caution. There is a significant degree of undercounting and failure to answer census questions specifically related to employment. For example, we don’t know where around 6% of the Sydney workforce works and another 4% have no fixed location. I have left these “location unknown” workers out of most of the following statistics.

Another complication is that changes between the 2001 and 2006 censuses which make it difficult to compare them. For example, the TDC report notes that 2006 journey to work data uses place of usual residence, while previous in years the place of enumeration was used for home location and trip origin.

In addition, I have used LGA-level data from another TDC journey to work table, which has slightly different employment totals to those in the centres report. Also, whilst the TDC centres are based on those in the Metropolitan Strategy, the data is not directly comparable to the figures in the Metro document. Above all, this material does not take into account the impact of the many changes that have occurred since 2006, including the global financial crisis. All this means that the following analysis should be seen as a guide and no responsibility is taken for its accuracy.

With the warnings out of the way, let’s have a look at the stats. Eastern Sydney obviously has the majority of employment and the majority of centres as defined by the TDC – 20, compared to 13 in Western Sydney. Of the people employed in centres, only 21% work in Greater Western Sydney (GWS) Within eastern Sydney (for these purposes, the area covered by the rest of the councils in the Sydney Statistical Division but outside the GWS region), over 230,000 people are employed in the CBD alone.

In fact, the CBD accounts for 12% of Sydney’s total employment – this makes up nearly a third of all of Sydney’s centres-based employment and over 20% of eastern Sydney’s jobs. Almost another 30% of eastern Sydney jobs are in other centres, which means that just under half the east’s employment is centre-based (table 1).

TABLE 1: SYDNEY EMPLOYMENT BY LOCATION, 2006 – Eastern Sydney and Western Sydney

Source: based on NSW Transport Data Centre data

*  Eastern Sydney – all Sydney LGAs outside Greater Western Sydney

** Western Sydney – the 14 LGAs comprising Greater Western Sydney

#  Not in centres totals based on TDC LGA employment tables

The story in Western Sydney is very different. Employment is much more dispersed – only just over a quarter of the region’s centre-based jobs are in TDC-defined centres and no one centre dominates. Parramatta, with just over 34,000 jobs, is Western Sydney’s biggest employment centre but accounts for under 6% of the region’s employment, with 19.6% of the region’s jobs located in other centres (table 2 and graph 1).

TABLE 2: SYDNEY EMPLOYMENT BY REGION SUMMARY, 2006

Source: based on NSW Transport Data Centre data

 * Eastern Sydney – all Sydney LGAs outside Greater Western Sydney

** Western Sydney – the 14 LGAs comprising Greater Western Sydney

#  Not in centres totals based on TDC LGA employment tables

Graph 1:

In my next post I’ll look at changes in employment centres from 2001 to 2006.