Although they are very different cities and Istanbul dwarfs Sydney in population terms, there are similarities. Both share the physical challenges of being divided by large bodies of water and steep ridges – and both have responded in similar ways, for example, by making extensive use of ferries. Both also adopted tram networks partly to deal with the hilly terrain, only to rip these up in the fifties and sixties in favour of cars and buses.
Now, both are undergoing suburban expansion in suburbs away from the coast and beyond the reach of each city’s current public transport infrastructure, while experiencing redevelopment in some older waterside suburbs. Initially both cities responded by investing heavily in road infrastructure, but are now looking belatedly at retrofitting (at considerable expense) public transport systems to deal with congestion and high car dependency, including heavy rail, light rail and busways.

Ferry traffic and the tramway crossing Istanbul's Golden Horn

There are of course major differences, apart from population size. Istanbul’s Bosporus and Golden Horn represent a much bigger challenge than Sydney Harbour and so its ferry system is much more extensive. On the other hand, Sydney may have got rid of its trams but it is blessed with an extensive suburban rail network, whereas Istanbul essentially has only two run-down and under-used suburban rail lines.

Istanbul’s other challenges are also far greater than Sydney’s; the city is close to the North Anatolian Fault and has experienced several major earthquakes in its history. This calls for special techniques in underground railway construction, especially if you are contemplating crossing under the Bosporous, which is over 60 metres deep.

If that wasn’t enough there is also Istanbul’s history as the capital of the Byzantine and then the Ottman Empires to contend with. For example, excavation works for the hub of a new rail network at Yenikapi have run into the remains of a fourth-century port, including a number of Byzantine vessels preserved in mud. Archaeological work on this site has already delayed the project by a number of years. As one of the project managers responsible observed, “I can’t think of any challenge this project lacks.”

Istanbul may face many more difficulties than Sydney and may be coming off a lower base in terms of pre-existing infrastructure, but it certainly has been more proactive in recent years. A metro, two light rail lines and a tramway have been constructed, along with a busway. Ironically, the tramway (which provides a public transport spine through the crowded heart of old Istanbul) and the busway (which links suburban population and employment centres) appear to be more extensively patronised than the new light rail and metro links, not to mention the older heavy rail lines.

The Istanbul tramway operates successfully despite very tight clearances

This is partly due to the relatively poor connectivity between these transport systems. Some current interchanges are very poor. For example, the Istanbul public transport map would have you believe that there is an interchange between the tramway and light rail at Aksaray, when this actually involves a 300 metre hike across several busy roads. Other “interchanges” are closer but still require crossing busy unsignalled highways to change from one line to another.

In an attempt to overcome this, the new transport interchange at Yenikapi is meant to bring together the heavy rail lines from Europe and Asia (the latter via the already-completed but not yet operational Mamaray tunnel under the Bosphorus), linking them with Istanbul’s metro and light rail lines. The light and heavy rail extensions associated with this will also provide better connectivity with the tramway – when the much-delayed interchange construction is eventually completed.

Yenikapi interchange under construction

Despite these problems there is still a lot that Sydney can learn from Istanbul, apart from the willingness to get on with the job of building infrastructure (regrettably, this is a lesson Sydney could draw from many other cities). Some examples include:

• Istanbul’s T1 tramway which threads through the narrow streets in the heart of the city provides a dramatic example of how light rail can operate successfully in busy and narrow CBD streets and in corridors where for environmental, engineering or budgetary reasons it is not possible to build metros. Compared to this, expanding Sydney’s light rail into the CBD and out to the eastern suburbs should be a doddle.

• The T1 tramway also demonstrates how trams cope with extremely high demand. While they are very well patronised to the point of being crowded, the high frequency of the trams in the T1 corridor seem to provide enough capacity. On this basis, any eastern suburbs extension of Sydney’s light rail should easily be able to meet demand until (and if) a metro is built, provided provision is made for much higher service frequencies than those on the current light rail.

Typical tramway station in Istanbul - with typical patronage levels

• If the challenges of building a heavy-rail tunnel under the deep, wide and earthquake-prone Bosphorus can be overcome, then it should be relatively straightforward to construct a second heavy rail crossing across Sydney Harbour, either in tunnel or as a second deck on the harbour bridge.

• It is also important to look at how such a link can be integrated with other transport modes on either side of the crossing. Interestingly, the approach in Istanbul appears to be use heavy rail to provide links between metros and other transport modes on both sides of the Bosphorus rather than attempting to join these directly. This approach may be relevant to Sydney, where for example a northern beaches light rail network could link to a heavy rail crossing north of the harbour.

• The Turkish government has not been afraid to set specific and ambitious targets for public transport patronage and then to make the required investment in infrastructure required to meet these targets. This is perhaps the ultimate lesson for NSW transport planners.

In a future post I’ll talk a bit more about the investments in Istanbul’s infrastructure but for now I’ll take a quick look at the fare system. For the most part, Istanbul is a flat-fare, token-based transport network. Tramways, buses, metros, light rail and railways require token entry, either on-board or at a turnstile, with each “jeton” or token costing 1.75 Turkish Lira or about 95 cents Australian, irrespective of the journey length.

This entitles you to a single trip on a single mode or vehicle, with no interchanges. I’ll come back to the Istanbul concept of “interchanges” in future as part of my discussion on infrastructure, but for the moment all you need to know is that for the most part, each change of mode or even vehicle requires use of an additional token. Ferry journeys use the same concept but here the price can vary with the journey length. Even simple curbside tram stops have token entry through turnstiles.

Istanbul tramway token and smartcard turnstiles

In addition Istabul has not one but two forms of integrated ticketing. The first “Akbil”, which is reputedly being phased out, is my favourite. According to Wikipedia, Akbil is an acronym formed from “akıllı”, which stands for “smart”, and “bilet” meaning “ticket”; Akbil is actually a small stainless steel “button” that looks remarkably like a large watch or clock battery but which has a computer chip inside.

The Akbil is used to store value for public transport use; once purchased from a kiosk or shop it can be topped up using fare machines at major transport hubs. Every time you pass through a public transport turnstile or board a bus you touch the Akbil to a little receiver which deducts the fare, giving you a discount of roughly 6% on the cost of a token.

In addition an Akbil can be used for more than one passenger by touching on again for each person. More significantly, it also provides a further deduction for multiple use within a two-hour period (though not when you are using it for multiple passengers), thus overcoming the penalty inherent in the token system for users who have to change modes or vehicles on the same journey.

Akbil is supposedly being phased out in favour of the Istanbulkart, a stored-value “electronic wallet” similar to the Oyster card. Apart from it’s credit card format, Istanbulkart operates in a very similar fashion to Akbil; you purchase it and top it up the same way and place it on the readers on every turnstile at the start of each trip. The card format is slated for wider use to pay for parking fees, taxis, admission to museums, movies, theatres and other cultural venues and even as a form of ID (see Turkey Travel Planner for more details).

Istanbul Akbil and Istanbulkart smart tickets

So what can Sydney learn from Istanbul’s experience in introducing electronic ticketing? Well, the first and most obvious thing is that they’ve actually gone and done it in all the time that NSW has talked about doing it, in large part because of the simplicity of the fare structure.

While I’m not a fan of flat fares, it’s obvious that Istanbul’s token system made it much easier to introduce electronic ticketing. Not only is there (pretty much) only one fare to incorporate, there is no need to make people touch off at the end of each journey. Touching off is probably unavoidable in any multiple-fare system (otherwise people get charged the maximum fare) but a simple zone-based structure is obviously going to be much easier to integrate into an electronic system.

The second is that, surprisingly, barrier entry seems to work even in the most unlikely of places, provided (again) the system is simple to use and fares are relatively low. Istanbul can be a fairly chaotic at times, but people seem to respect the system and even in the many places where it would be easy to get away with I did not see any attempts at fare evasion. No doubt it occurs, but it does not seem widespread.

The third is the commitment to overcome flagfall costs inherent in the flat-fare token system by offering discounts for multiple journeys. While Sydney does not have flat fares, bus users in particular suffer from the same problem that their Istanbul counterparts do (or did) – a journey involving multiple vehicles ends up costing much more than one of equivalent distance which can be made using a single bus. To a large extent the Akbil and Istanbulkart overcome this with the introduction of what is effectively a time-based ticket, which seems to work very well.

And why do I prefer Akbil over its more “modern” card replacement? I think it’s partly subjective – the little Akbil button and holder has a more tactile feel than a transport card – and partly practical. The Akbil can reside happily in your pocket attached to your key-ring, making it easy to pull out at turnstiles, while using the card involves digging out your wallet or purse, finding the Istanbulkart among all the other cards, placing it on the reader and then putting it away again.

You can now use a MyMulti 1, 2 or 3, a MyMulti Day Pass, a Pensioner Excursion Ticket (PET) or a Family Funday Sunday ticket on the light rail. All these tickets have to be purchased prior to boarding a tram.

However, CityRail single-trip, return or weekly tickets are still not valid, nor are any bus-only tickets or concessions apart from the PET. Metro Light Rail also continues to issue the full range of its own tickets which are valid only for its own services. More on ticketing issues in my next post but first, how are the new arrangements operating and what has been the impact on patronage?

Trams don’t have ticket validators, so when you board a tram and show the conductor a My Multi or other valid ticket, he or she will usually issue a zero-value ticket. This is simple in practice but a ticket showing “$.00” value is a very odd thing to receive.

MyMulti zero ticket (image from Wikipedia)

This brings us to patronage. I don’t have any figures (and if any are released, bear in mind the method of counting) so my evidence is based on my observations and anecdotal evidence, but there seems to be a small but noticeable increase in the number of tram users, particularly older users who qualify for PETs.

In particular there seems to be more people using the tram for short-haul trips, especially between Central, Capitol Square and Paddy’s Markets. For most people this is a walkable distance, but if you are infirm, carrying a lot of shopping or just in a hurry, the tram provides by far the best public transport connection between these points, especially if you already have a PET or MyMulti.

While the overall patronage increase seems relatively small, I was struck by the large number of passengers who did produce MyMulti and PET tickets on the tram, especially coming from or going to Central. This would seem to indicate that a significant proportion of people are already using the light rail in combination with trains; now they can use their MyMulti and other valid tickets without having to pay an additional tram fare.

Given the location of the current MLR terminus at Central, this is hardly surprising, but it also reflects the fact that the current ticket integration model tends to favour passengers transferring from trains rather than those who catch buses. For many train users, purchase of a weekly MyMulti costs little more than a weekly rail ticket but provides much better value – including now the light rail – and doesn’t lock them into travel between two stations on a particular corridor.

For bus users, especially in the inner city, it’s a different story. Even a Zone 1 MyMulti is relatively expensive, especially if passengers don’t have any opportunities to use trains or ferries. For these users, Travel10s are a cheaper alternative and offer reasonable flexibility – but these tickets, like all bus tickets, are not recognised on the light rail.

Part of the problem lies in the “unfinished” nature of the MyMulti ticket system, which I’ll look at in my next post.

The announcement also echoes many of the governance recommendations of the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) Independent Public Transport Inquiry. This called for a similar coordinating transport authority, though the government’s ITA will have a much bigger remit. There are other key differences, but let’s start with the similarities which are striking (and pleasing for those of us who worked on the SMH Inquiry).

The SMH Inquiry proposed a transport coordination authority managed by an independent board to plan and manage all aspects of Sydney’s public transport. Rail, bus and ferry operators would have been contracted on a contestable basis to provide services to the authority, which would have taken over and integrated their planning powers.

The SMH Inquiry report also proposed that the authority would prioritise customer service and the importance of providing each public transport user with a complete journey to meet their requirements rather than a set of disconnected bus, rail or ferry trips. This would have involved a branch dedicated to integrating all aspects of service provision including fares, ticketing, timetables, interchanges and information provision.

While the SMH proposal did not incorporate the management of car-based transport, the authority would have had a strong say in the approval of major new road projects.

The government’s ITA is very similar in that it will also integrate all aspects of public transport. It also emphasises customer service; there will be a division specifically dedicated to “Customer Experience”, which in the words of the Ministerial media release, “will make sure journeys are as simple and seamless as possible”.

There are other structural similarities, with divisions responsible for planning, services, projects and policies. The ITA will also take over planning powers from the individual transport agencies, much as the SMH Inquiry proposed, and use these resources to develop a comprehensive transport “masterplan”.

There are however some significant differences. These can be summarised as follows:

• The ITA will not be managed by an independent board, although an independent advisory board will be appointed by the government. The exact relationship of this to the ITA is unclear.
• The ITA will take over procurement, long-term planning and policy-making from the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) as well as from public transport agencies, thus giving it direct oversight of major road projects.
• The ITA will also manage freight transport and oversee transport across the State, not just in greater Sydney.
• However, it will not have the final say on major infrastructure projects, with the government intending to establish a state infrastructure body.

Despite these differences, the government’s new body is a huge step forward for transport planning and management in NSW. It is hard to disagree with the sentiment in the joint ministerial media release about the need to replace the current disconnected transport “silos” with a “streamlined agency which plans and delivers for all modes” and to concentrate on improving the transport user’s experience.

There is also compelling logic in integrating and extending the planning and management of transport statewide and to include road and freight transport as well as public transport. However, the government’s new approach is very ambitious and not without its risks:

• The first challenge for the new body will be getting on top of this enormous range of responsibilities and the associated expectations. While the primary reason for not including roads planning and transport management outside Sydney in the SMH Transport Inquiry recommendations was that these areas were outside its main terms of reference, there was also a desire to keep the proposed authority as lean as possible and focussed on Sydney’s public transport, which is a big enough challenge in its own right. The ITA has been handed a much more complex role and will need to be able to balance the competing demands of city and country, roads and public transport.
• Taking over planning powers from the current piecemeal collection of agencies and in particular the RTA will involve not just a short-term period of dislocation but also a long-term process of major cultural change, both within the agencies and at the political level as well. This will not be easy; for example, the attempted merger (by the previous state government) some years ago of infrastructure, transport and landuse planning had similar aims. However it began to unravel soon after the departure of the responsible Minister and was quietly dismantled shortly thereafter.
• Indeed, the Roads Minister has openly acknowledged the need to change the public perception of the “arrogance” of the RTA. Given the dominant role it has played in NSW infrastructure planning for decades and its success in getting motorway projects built, it will be fascinating to see if the RTA meekly accepts its new role of being just another transport provider.
• Having created a “mega-authority” with such far-reaching powers over all aspects of transport, it is understandable that the government has decided to separate the process of managing the state’s overall infrastructure program from transport planning. However, it will need to clarify the relationship between the two authorities and also how the additional funds required to meet the huge shortfall in public transport infrastructure will be provided.

Despite these concerns, the Government is to be congratulated on what is, in “Yes Minister” parlance, a “courageous” decision.  Given the widespread public cynicism regarding previous public transport plans and announcements, it will need to be equally courageous in ensuring that the planning and prioritisation processes to be implemented by the authority are also credible and transparent and above all, that the resulting projects are funded and built.

First, a letter from Sandy Thomas (another member of the Sydney Morning Herald Public Transport Inquiry that reported last year) published in today’s Herald offers another and probably more achievable scenario on how the North West Rail Link (NWRL) can be built without loss of face by either Federal or State Governments.

He points out that the former State Government submitted a detailed proposal to Infrastructure Australia (IA) for funding for the NWRL. The letter notes that despite this, the funding for the Parramatta-Epping Rail Link was subsequently offered by the Federal Government from another non-IA pool. In summary, Thomas proposes that the previous State Government’s NWRL application for IA funding be revived and properly examined by IA as a basis for funding the North West line.

Second, it has been suggested that a “number eight” for my list should be full retention of the old Kings School site in Parramatta in public hands.

One of the last actions of the Keneally government was to announce that the bulk of the site would be retained and redeveloped as an arts and cultural precinct, with the sale of a small section to the Catholic Church providing some funding. It would appear that the Church still harbours some desire to obtain the whole site and the new government has not yet indicated whether it will continue to support the precinct proposal.

I strongly support this cause, but the “top seven” actions I listed in my last post were mainly to do with public transport infrastructure and strategic planning. However, reassuring the Western Sydney community that the Kings School site will be retained and developed as planned by the previous government (and not sold to fill some budgetary “black hole”) is something Mr O’Farrell could do easily in his first 100 days.

If I prepare a similar ”top seven” for Western Sydney, developing the Kings School as an arts and cultural precinct in public hands will certainly be on my list!

The new Premier has got off on the right foot by announcing that he will implement a first 100-day action plan which will have a primary focus on transport issues. Although there is some debate about whether the electorate regards transport or health issues as the highest priority for action, there is no doubt that the previous government’s underinvestment in public transport infrastructure and its chaotic administration of the transport portfolio were the most public symbols of its failure.

Just as success has a thousand parents while failure is an orphan, new governments find themselves with lots of new friends and plenty of people offering free advice about their policy priorities (unlike new oppositions, which only get post-mortems for free). I’m joining a long queue, but in this spirit I’d like to offer seven suggestions on what the Premier should do in the next 100 days, specifically relating to planning and transport:

1. Don’t reinvent the wheel – just get it turning. There is no need for the new government to restart all transport and metropolitan planning from scratch. Transport in particular has been the subject of exhaustive planning processes, through the previous government’s transport strategies and those prepared independently, most notably the Sydney Morning Herald’s Public Transport Inquiry (in which I participated).  These have identified the key infrastructure projects required in the next 10 to 15 years.

While existing plans will need to be updated and the whole planning process rebuilt in the longer term (see suggestion no. 3), there are already more than enough planned projects on which work can begin. What we really need is a commitment to their funding and implementation, the things that have been sadly lacking in the past three decades. In the first 100 days the new government needs to consolidate the existing plans as a basis for immediate action.

Epping Station (from Wikipedia)

2. Repeal Part 3A – but clarify what it will be replaced with. The new government’s commitment to repeal Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, which allows the government to take over from councils the assessment of “state significant” development applications, is very welcome. Under the previous government the definition of “state significant” had been increasingly widened to the point where it no longer had any meaning.

This commitment can easily be implemented within 100 days. However, there will still be some need for government input on the really major project proposals that will have a significant impact on a wider region.  To deal with these – and to reduce the temptation for future governments to reintroduce Part 3A-type powers via the back door – a collaborative framework between state and local governments needs to be established at the same time Part 3A is abolished (see next suggestion).

3. Set up a real partnership with local government to run the planning process. The promises made by the new government and reiterated by shadow ministers in the run-up to the election to consult and work with councils and Regional Organisations of Councils (ROCs) are also welcome, especially in the context of regional and metropolitan planning.

This initiative requires a meaningful and sustained commitment from both sides. The new Government should establish a dialogue with local government in the first 100 days to develop a new medium and long-term planning process as well as a mechanism to handle major development proposals – a difficult task with over 150 councils. This means that councils will also need to cooperate through the ROCs or other structures to present a coherent and strategic response.

4. 50:50 or 30:70 – it’s also a case of where people want to live. Mr O’Farrell has already made a commitment to change the target for the ratio between the population urban redevelopment in existing suburbs and new housing in greenfields areas from the current 70 to 30 percent to a 50:50 balance.

This needs to be carefully considered. Population movement is usually gradual process – people tend to move outwards in a “shuffle” as they change houses in Sydney, and not by leaps and bounds. While cheaper housing at the urban fringe might cause an initial flurry of interest, this demand may not be sustained as people increasingly consider the cost of transport and limited range of services available in these areas.

The new government therefore should commit in the first 100 days to a process to examine whether people actually want to move out to the outer suburbs in such numbers. And if the government proceeds, it must to commit to providing all the infrastructure required when these new suburbs are developed. To do otherwise would be to continue the vicious cycle of backlog and underinvestment that has plagued development in Western Sydney since the 1950s.

5. Sort out who’s going to prioritise transport infrastructure – and make sure the RTA doesn’t get in first. The new government has proposed the establishment of a new body called Infrastructure NSW to oversee all major infrastructure decisions as well as a separate Independent Transport Authority to oversee all public transport planning and operations.

While the infrastructure authority concept has drawn on the Herald’s Transport Inquiry’s recommendations, the proposal to create two separate authorities is an important difference. The Inquiry’s proposal was for a single authority to oversee all aspects of public transport, including infrastructure.

Having two bodies instead of one creates a potential for duplication and even conflict. The new transport authority will presumably have to pitch its proposals to the infrastructure body, competing with other departments including experienced hands such as the Roads and Traffic Authority. There is also a danger that public transport could be disadvantaged if Infrastructure NSW adopts narrow assessment frameworks to assess these projects.

To avoid this happening, the new government needs to move quickly to clarify the relationship between the two authorities. It also needs to ensure that public transport receives the priority it deserves and that Infrastructure NSW uses a broad range of environmental and social criteria in project assessment.

6. Recognise that the money for infrastructure has to come from somewhere. The Sydney Morning Herald’s Public Transport Inquiry not only identified and costed a range of transport options, it also looked at how to fund these projects.

There is no such thing as a free lunch, or a free transport system.  The Inquiry nominated a mix of funding options to raise the funds required, including fare increases, parking, registration and other levies, congestion charges and Commonwealth Government support. While at first glance none of these would seem to be very popular, the Inquiry also found that a significant majority of people are willing to pay for the redevelopment of the public transport network, so important do they regard this issue. The 100-day plan needs to include a commitment to identify funding sources for public transport infrastructure.

If both governments dig in, there is a strong risk that the Federal Government will simply trouser the $2.1 billion it has offered for the Parramatta-Epping link and use the money elsewhere. This would be a dismal result for NSW and Mr O’Farrell and the new Transport Minister should quickly exercise some nimble footwork to reach a compromise.

One solution would be to treat both links as a single, staged project, effectively providing a link from Parramatta via Epping to Rouse Hill and incorporating the full extension of the North West link to meet the existing Richmond Line.

The total cost would be considerable, but (along with the South West Link under construction) would be a major investment in Western Sydney’s future. It would mean that all major employment centres and residential release areas in the region would be linked by rail to each other, as well as to major destinations in eastern Sydney.

There would also be major savings in combining the projects, which lend themselves to a staged approach. Planning for the North West project is much more recent and considerably more advanced than for Parramatta-Epping, especially as the route for the latter is yet to be finalised.

This means that tunnelling could start in the North West and then continue straight after completion onto the Parramatta-Epping Link once planning for that is finished. Fit-out of both sectors could proceed in the same way and then North-West line completed to the Richmond Line.

This article identified 36 reasons for the superiority of trams. These Jarrett classified into three groups:

• “misdirected differences”, for example, those such as electric propulsion and dedicated rights of way which are often associated with rail-based technology but which can be (and have been) applied to buses;
• “cultural feedback effects” which relate to the way trains, trams and buses are treated culturally, for example perceptions that “buses are for poor people” or that rail-based systems are more permanent are not technical differences but rather cultural constructs that can become self-reinforcing;
• “intrinsic differences”. Those are the “real” technical differences between bus and rail such as capacity, ride quality, energy efficiency and costs. Jarrett claimed that there were only seven such differences and only three were clearly to rail’s advantage.

This is a thoughtful piece and provoked lively debate. I didn’t entirely agree with Jarrett’s approach and took a slightly different tack. This is an edited version of my response (it’s useful but not essential to read Jarrett’s piece first).

 I think the approach of trying to identify the real “uniqueness” of bus and rail technology is important but I don’t think can be completely divorced from the nature of the corridors and services involved.

This is especially true at the “extremes”. For example, to provide a small, localised transport service in low density outer-suburban or rural areas (either on demand or on a scheduled basis), bus technology using existing roads is clearly the only answer because of its low cost and flexibility. Nobody would contemplate using any form of rail technology for something like this.

Translohr guided vehicle in Clermont-Ferrand, France (all images from Wikipedia)

At the other end of the scale would be high speed and/or high frequency and high capacity services in dedicated and completely grade-separated corridors such as high-speed suburban and interurban rail services or underground metros. Even if all the “non-intrinsic” differences were eliminated, bus technology would simply not be able to offer the same level of service in these situations for a number of reasons.

An example is the Perth-Mandurah high-speed suburban rail line in WA, where buses would be unlikely to be able to offer the same fast travel times even if they had a dedicated corridor (in this context, maximum speed is probably another intrinsic difference between the two technologies, though it has to be acknowledged that for many transport corridors this probably isn’t a significant issue).

Adelaide O-Bahn (guided busway)

In the case of metros, if you were to take buses as your starting point, eliminated the non-intrinsic differences and minimised the intrinsic ones in order to meet the demands of providing a high-capacity, underground service, you would have to add electric traction, vehicle guidance, automated signalling systems, multiple trailers, platform loading etc, etc. The result would then be virtually indistinguishable from rail technology, apart from running on rubber tyres, so it would end up looking pretty much like the tyre-based Paris metro lines – and probably cost about the same as metal rail technology anyway.

In fact the Infrastructurist article (that inspired Jarrett’s article) talks mainly about the differences between streetcars and buses, not rail versus road-based transport generally. The points Jarrett has raised are also most relevant when applied to street-running bus services and trams, or a little further up the foodchain, busways and dedicated light rail corridors. In both cases there is much more overlap between bus and rail-based services than at the extremes I mentioned earlier.

Melbourne tram leased from Mulhouse

There are a few other issues worth noting regarding this debate, however. Generally speaking, bus technology has to be more fully “optioned-up” from its base form than rail to eliminate the non-intrinsic factors and mitigate the others. Ride quality is a good example. Basic trams running on well-maintained tracks in mixed-flow situations will usually offer a better ride than buses in a similar situation.

It is only in dedicated corridors that the latter have the potential to approach the standard of the former and even this requires careful planning and additional construction costs – for example, the decision to build the Western Sydney bus transitways to light rail standard to allow for their potential conversion, or the extent to which the Brisbane busways were engineered to improve ride quality.

Los Angeles light rail

In some respects it’s a bit like choosing between a top-of-the-range car with all the extras built in or the basic model and then adding on the extras. Often the latter would end up being more expensive and the technology not as well integrated as the “de-luxe” model. In the case of busways, I understand that the cost of the dedicated busways in Sydney and Brisbane approached that of light rail.

This isn’t necessarily a reason not to build busways if they offer other advantages, but if all the options Jarrett’s article mentioned are added (such as electric traction, vehicle guidance, etc) to mitigate the “non-intrinsic” differences, they could well cost more than light rail. This expense also often results in trade-offs being made in relation to busways, as highlighted in many of the responses to Jarrett’s post.

A couple of other observations. I would add another intrinsic difference – rail, by its nature, has a built-in standardised “guidance system”. While there are differences in rail gauges and other associated technology, and railcar or tram of a given gauge will conform to this basic guidance system. This means it is possible for many tram and light rail systems to purchase vehicles off the shelf or lease them from other systems with little modification.

Cologne light rail operating as a metro

Of course, basic buses used for ordinary street-running of course have very few compatibility issues, but the situation is much more complex in relation to guided buses. There are at least four different basic technologies (kerb-guided, central rail, optical and electromagnetic) in use and eight or nine incompatible guidance systems based on these technologies. This isn’t to argue against the concept of guided busways, which have a lot of potential, but unless a dominant guidance technology emerges, rail should be considered to have an advantage in this area. You simply can’t buy a guided bus off the shelf.

Another interesting area of difference is flexibility and scale. Of course, buses have an advantage that the same vehicles can go very easily from running mixed-flow systems servicing local bus-stops in outer suburban areas to providing dedicated busway services in higher-density corridors.

While trams and light rail can’t match the flexibility of buses at the suburban level, they can be more easily scaled up at the other end. The transport system in Cologne and some other German cities are good examples, where trams can start in outer suburbs with basic on-street services, then run in dedicated corridors as light-rail services in middle-ring suburbs, much like busways – however, they then go underground to provide metro-like high capacity services in the CBD, a feat that would be much more difficult to do with buses.

apexart is a not-for-profit contemporary visual arts organisation located in Lower Manhattan, New York. Through exhibitions, international residency, publication initiatives, and programs and events, it is committed to “cultural and intellectual diversity and aims to stimulate public dialogue about contemporary art”. It attempts to “promote consideration” among local audiences while extending this dialogue to international audiences through print and electronic outreach.

One program run by apexart is “Franchise“, which involves a worldwide open call for 400-word proposals asking participants why the franchise should come to their town and provide all of the support necessary to produce an exhibition. The winner gets to be be the director and curator of his or her own apexart franchise with an $8,000 budget, small salary and almost complete control. apexart provides funding and guidance. This includes an apexart brochure in an edition of 10,000 and its distribution around the world. To quote apexart, “the Franchise is an opportunity to help bring a new idea to fruition in a new place and to illustrate that the center of the world is wherever you are.”

Damascus-Hejaz Station - open only from 1913 to 1917 (from Wikipedia)

The 2011 winners, Eric Gottesman and Toleen Touq are based in Amman, Jordan, and their entry is worth quoting in full:

We Have Woven the Motherlands with Nets of Iron

At the turn of the 20th century, the Hejaz, a narrow-gauge railway built south from Damascus to transport pilgrims to Mecca during the Hajj, represented a tangible, if utopic, dream of a united Middle East. Part divine aspiration, part vehicle for political gain, the train was designed to connect Istanbul through present-day Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the holiest cities of Islam. A decade later, the British, eager to replace the Ottoman Empire with its own, initiated what would become decades of European battles in the region. The dream was obliterated: Lawrence of Arabia and a Bedouin army blew the railway apart during WWI. It never recovered but the tracks still remain. After the rise and fall of empires, what is left of the withered dream to transcend physical and metaphysical borders? Having endured wars and conquests, the trains persist, limping along, rented out to nostalgic tourists and enthusiasts.

A modern light rail system threatens to replace the historic Hejaz as urban Amman sprawls eastward into the desert. Trains, like Arab unity itself, have a romantic geography: nearly obsolete, valued for historical symbolism, begging to be updated or made once again relevant. We propose to revisit this older way of moving through the Jordanian landscape, to restage the dream of regional cohesion, to repopulate the Hejaz with events created by artists from the countries through which the train once ran.

We will invite artists from each of the four countries of the Hejaz (Jordan, Saudi, Syria, and Turkey) to produce installations, performances on movable platforms, archival projects using remnants of the rail lines and other projects, all of which will take place on the rails in Jordan.

The Hedjaz Jordan Railway "International Train" at Amman Station (from Wikipedia)

The relationship between railways, nationalism and colonialism is long and complex, but it is interesting that the idea of a Middle East united through a rail network has been around for so long, even if it was shattered by world wars, oil wars and other conflicts. And while trains may have become “nearly obsolete” in this part of the world, they are being “made once again relevant”. Recently the  concept of a rather grandly-titled “International Rail Network” for the Middle East was revived and while progress to date has been haphazard, the Gulf Arab states are now planning to spend more than $US100 billion on rail projects across the region.

The first is a Fairfax article which reports that a survey by research firm UMR shows that almost 80 per cent of Australians would consider using high-speed rail if it was available for holiday travel, while almost 9 per cent of those surveyed support the reopening of country railways. Perhaps not surprisingly, 60 per cent strongly supported the concept of cheap $1 rail tickets for individuals and families during holidays, while 30% supported the idea.

The survey appears to have been undertaken in the context of reducing the national holiday road toll; the distances involved and whether the questions were put in relation to rural or metropolitan train travel (or both) was not indicated in the article. However, even allowing for this and the fact that the research was commissioned by the national rail union, the results show a striking level of support for rail travel.

In the second rail-related news story to emerge today, Downer EDI has announced that the next generation of Sydney commuter trains will not start operating until late May or early June because of production delays. The company will also take a $250 million hit on the Waratah train contract, on top of a $190 million provision made last year.

Although the company claimed in December that it would hand the first Waratah trains to RailCorp by early January, it now says it has found bugs in the train’s electronics and has had to recruit “more senior staff with experience in train-building” and change its production schedule. This delay will make delivery of the trains to RailCorp 14 months behind schedule.

Contrast this state of affairs – a rolling stock order continually deferred and the unfulfilled desire of Australians for high-speed rail travel – with what is happening on two other continents, Asia and North America.

In China, the 1,318 kilometre high-speed link between Beijing and Shanghai has just opened, cutting travel time in half to less than five hours.  This is the longest high-speed line in the world – the entire French TGV system totals 1,700 kilometres.

Chinese High Speed Train - courtesy Wikipedia

 In little over a decade China has constructed the world’s largest high-speed rail network, at over 8,350 kilometres. It is expected that the system will reach 16,000 kilometres by 2016. Thousands of kilometres of urban railways are also planned to add to the systems and lines already opened.

China is not alone. Other Asian countries from Thailand to the Middle East have recently opened or are constructing major metro lines and high speed rail links, with even more ambitious plans for the future.

Los Angeles metro trains - courtesy Wikipedia

Even in North America, the land of the private car, 21 new light and heavy rail systems opened over the past decade and many existing ones were extended. In the next 12 months five new light rail lines or extensions will open, along with two new commuter rail corridors. A dozen public transport projects will begin construction, joining over 25 projects already underway.

So, in less than the time it has taken the (previous) Australian Government to announce and abandon an extensive feasibility inquiry into high speed rail – and then its successor to convene another “strategic study”  – the Chinese have built over 8,000 kilometres of high-speed track.

And in the time it has taken the NSW Government to build one suburban rail extension (Epping to Chatswood), commence another (South West Rail Link) and announce, cancel and re-announce about half a dozen other metros and heavy rail links, scores of North American and Chinese cities have built major rail extensions, new lines and in some cases constructed complete metro or light rail systems.

I know that Australia has greater distances and lower population densities than either North America or China, but surely we can do better than this. Judging by the UMR research, the Australian public certainly think so.

However, before the New Zealanders start to look at the record books (and leaving aside for a moment the question of whether amalgamations are a good thing or not), even the Auckland amalgamation is dwarfed by media reports of plans in southern China to create the world’s biggest mega-city with a population of 42 million by amalgamating nine existing municipalities. These include Guangzhou, which already has a population of around 25 million and is currently the world’s second-largest city.

Even in area the new city will be vast, at over 41,400 square kilometres.  This is an area described in the online articles as “twice the size of Wales” – or to put it in Antipodean terms, 60% of the size of Tasmania. This is China’s manufacturing heartland, comprising almost 10% of the Chinese economy.

The proposal seems to be aimed at standardising a range of services such as public transport and health care which are offered at the municipal level in China, making it easier for citizens of each of the existing cities to access services across an area where huge population growth is rendering existing boundaries largely meaningless.  It is also intended to give the region an advantage over competing urban areas around Beijing and Shanghai.

The merger will be supported by around 150 major infrastructure projects which will integrate and expand the existing transport, energy, water and telecommunications systems. These plans include 29 rail lines including an express line to Hong Kong. The total cost is around $196 billion.

Just how these projects will be financed is unclear and perhaps not surprisingly there is little news of any opposition to the amalgamation in the Western media, but at least it is refreshing that council amalgamation is seen in China as a basis for additional investment on a vast scale – and not just an excuse for governments to save money!