There is no doubt that Mr O’Farrell and his party scored an emphatic victory in the NSW election, rewriting the record books in the process. While the main factor in the result was the electorate’s obvious dissatisfaction with the performance of the previous government, the size of its win has given the new Government an unprecedented mandate to implement its policy agenda. The question is, where should they start?

The new Premier has got off on the right foot by announcing that he will implement a first 100-day action plan which will have a primary focus on transport issues. Although there is some debate about whether the electorate regards transport or health issues as the highest priority for action, there is no doubt that the previous government’s underinvestment in public transport infrastructure and its chaotic administration of the transport portfolio were the most public symbols of its failure.

Just as success has a thousand parents while failure is an orphan, new governments find themselves with lots of new friends and plenty of people offering free advice about their policy priorities (unlike new oppositions, which only get post-mortems for free). I’m joining a long queue, but in this spirit I’d like to offer seven suggestions on what the Premier should do in the next 100 days, specifically relating to planning and transport:

1. Don’t reinvent the wheel – just get it turning. There is no need for the new government to restart all transport and metropolitan planning from scratch. Transport in particular has been the subject of exhaustive planning processes, through the previous government’s transport strategies and those prepared independently, most notably the Sydney Morning Herald’s Public Transport Inquiry (in which I participated).  These have identified the key infrastructure projects required in the next 10 to 15 years.

While existing plans will need to be updated and the whole planning process rebuilt in the longer term (see suggestion no. 3), there are already more than enough planned projects on which work can begin. What we really need is a commitment to their funding and implementation, the things that have been sadly lacking in the past three decades. In the first 100 days the new government needs to consolidate the existing plans as a basis for immediate action.

Epping Station (from Wikipedia)

2. Repeal Part 3A – but clarify what it will be replaced with. The new government’s commitment to repeal Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, which allows the government to take over from councils the assessment of “state significant” development applications, is very welcome. Under the previous government the definition of “state significant” had been increasingly widened to the point where it no longer had any meaning.

This commitment can easily be implemented within 100 days. However, there will still be some need for government input on the really major project proposals that will have a significant impact on a wider region.  To deal with these – and to reduce the temptation for future governments to reintroduce Part 3A-type powers via the back door – a collaborative framework between state and local governments needs to be established at the same time Part 3A is abolished (see next suggestion).

3. Set up a real partnership with local government to run the planning process. The promises made by the new government and reiterated by shadow ministers in the run-up to the election to consult and work with councils and Regional Organisations of Councils (ROCs) are also welcome, especially in the context of regional and metropolitan planning.

This initiative requires a meaningful and sustained commitment from both sides. The new Government should establish a dialogue with local government in the first 100 days to develop a new medium and long-term planning process as well as a mechanism to handle major development proposals – a difficult task with over 150 councils. This means that councils will also need to cooperate through the ROCs or other structures to present a coherent and strategic response.

4. 50:50 or 30:70 – it’s also a case of where people want to live. Mr O’Farrell has already made a commitment to change the target for the ratio between the population urban redevelopment in existing suburbs and new housing in greenfields areas from the current 70 to 30 percent to a 50:50 balance.

This needs to be carefully considered. Population movement is usually gradual process – people tend to move outwards in a “shuffle” as they change houses in Sydney, and not by leaps and bounds. While cheaper housing at the urban fringe might cause an initial flurry of interest, this demand may not be sustained as people increasingly consider the cost of transport and limited range of services available in these areas.

The new government therefore should commit in the first 100 days to a process to examine whether people actually want to move out to the outer suburbs in such numbers. And if the government proceeds, it must to commit to providing all the infrastructure required when these new suburbs are developed. To do otherwise would be to continue the vicious cycle of backlog and underinvestment that has plagued development in Western Sydney since the 1950s.

5. Sort out who’s going to prioritise transport infrastructure – and make sure the RTA doesn’t get in first. The new government has proposed the establishment of a new body called Infrastructure NSW to oversee all major infrastructure decisions as well as a separate Independent Transport Authority to oversee all public transport planning and operations.

While the infrastructure authority concept has drawn on the Herald’s Transport Inquiry’s recommendations, the proposal to create two separate authorities is an important difference. The Inquiry’s proposal was for a single authority to oversee all aspects of public transport, including infrastructure.

Having two bodies instead of one creates a potential for duplication and even conflict. The new transport authority will presumably have to pitch its proposals to the infrastructure body, competing with other departments including experienced hands such as the Roads and Traffic Authority. There is also a danger that public transport could be disadvantaged if Infrastructure NSW adopts narrow assessment frameworks to assess these projects.

To avoid this happening, the new government needs to move quickly to clarify the relationship between the two authorities. It also needs to ensure that public transport receives the priority it deserves and that Infrastructure NSW uses a broad range of environmental and social criteria in project assessment.

6. Recognise that the money for infrastructure has to come from somewhere. The Sydney Morning Herald’s Public Transport Inquiry not only identified and costed a range of transport options, it also looked at how to fund these projects.

There is no such thing as a free lunch, or a free transport system.  The Inquiry nominated a mix of funding options to raise the funds required, including fare increases, parking, registration and other levies, congestion charges and Commonwealth Government support. While at first glance none of these would seem to be very popular, the Inquiry also found that a significant majority of people are willing to pay for the redevelopment of the public transport network, so important do they regard this issue. The 100-day plan needs to include a commitment to identify funding sources for public transport infrastructure.

If both governments dig in, there is a strong risk that the Federal Government will simply trouser the $2.1 billion it has offered for the Parramatta-Epping link and use the money elsewhere. This would be a dismal result for NSW and Mr O’Farrell and the new Transport Minister should quickly exercise some nimble footwork to reach a compromise.

One solution would be to treat both links as a single, staged project, effectively providing a link from Parramatta via Epping to Rouse Hill and incorporating the full extension of the North West link to meet the existing Richmond Line.

The total cost would be considerable, but (along with the South West Link under construction) would be a major investment in Western Sydney’s future. It would mean that all major employment centres and residential release areas in the region would be linked by rail to each other, as well as to major destinations in eastern Sydney.

There would also be major savings in combining the projects, which lend themselves to a staged approach. Planning for the North West project is much more recent and considerably more advanced than for Parramatta-Epping, especially as the route for the latter is yet to be finalised.

This means that tunnelling could start in the North West and then continue straight after completion onto the Parramatta-Epping Link once planning for that is finished. Fit-out of both sectors could proceed in the same way and then North-West line completed to the Richmond Line.

In my last post I looked at the snapshot of Sydney’s 33 largest employment centres provided by the NSW Transport Data Centre (TDC) in its Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, based on the Metropolitan Strategy centres hierarchy. The TDC report also discussed employment growth in the period 1996 to 2006, which is the topic of this post (note: the qualifications about the data I mentioned in my previous post also apply to the statistics below).

The report shows 71,350 new jobs were created in Sydney between 2001 and 2006, with 26,600 (37%) of these jobs in centres. There was a growth rate of 4% for both employment centres and the Sydney statistical division (SD) generally. However, employment grew much faster between 1996 and 2001, when it increased in centres grew by 13% and across the Sydney SD by 9%.

As I said earlier, whilst the TDC report is a great metro-wide overview, digging deeper on a regional basis provides another perspective. To do this I restructured the graph in the TDC report showing centres growth in the 1996 to 2001 and 2001 to 2006 periods into two graphs for eastern and Western Sydney (graphs 1 and 2) and a summary table for the period 2001 to 2006 (table 1). This affirms the extent to which growth rates slowed in 2001 to 2006 across both regions, but also reveals that there was considerable variation between eastern and Western Sydney.

Graph 1:

Graph 2:

TABLE 1: SYDNEY EMPLOYMENT GROWTH BY REGION SUMMARY, 2001-2006

Source: based on NSW Transport Data Centre data

* Eastern Sydney – all Sydney LGAs outside Greater Western Sydney

** Western Sydney – the 14 LGAs comprising Greater Western Sydney

In both regions and most centres there was strong growth between 1996 and 2001. However in 2001 to 2006 the pattern diverged. In eastern Sydney the CBD grew by over 5% and centres such as Ultimo/Pyrmont, Macquarie Park, Rhodes, Randwick and Sydney Airport also experienced considerable growth. Meanwhile other areas such as Surry Hills/Kings Cross, St Leonards/Crows Nest and South Sydney lost jobs. Overall, centre-based employment grew by only 1.8% and growth was higher outside the centres than within them in eastern Sydney.

The story in Western Sydney was quite different. Employment growth across GWS centres in the period 2001 to 2006 of 12.5% was much stronger than the average in eastern Sydney centres and stronger than employment growth overall in the Sydney SD. It was also stronger than in areas outside the main employment centres.

This growth was also more widely spread across the key centres. Only Wetherill Park showed a significant loss, although Bankstown decreased marginally. Norwest, Eastern Creek, Castle Hill, Olympic Park, Westmead, Huntingwood and Campbelltown experienced much stronger growth. Unlike eastern Sydney where the CBD experienced strong growth, there was only a marginal increase in employment in Sydney’s second CBD, Parramatta.

All this would seem to suggest that strategies to concentrate employment are having more success in Western Sydney. However, there are some major qualifications. The increase in employment in the GWS centres has come off a very low base, with the result that centres-based employment still makes up only 25.3% of all employment in the region and a mere 7.8% of Sydney’s overall employment. Furthermore, much of this growth has occurred in centres such as Norwest and Castle Hill which are very poorly served by public transport (Norwest alone accounted for 37% of the growth in centre-based employment in Western Sydney).

In the next few posts I’ll consider the relationship of employment to population growth and the resulting transport implications.

In December 2008 the NSW Transport Data Centre (TDC) released Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, which detailed employment and commuting statistics for Sydney’s 33 largest employment centres based on the Metropolitan Strategy centres hierarchy. This came out around the same time as the research conducted by the University of Western Sydney (UWS) Urban Research Centre in developing the Western Sydney employment strategies for WSROC. These studies complement each other and deserve further attention.

The TDC report notes that in 2006 there were 1,923,900 people employed in the Sydney statistical division (SD) in 2006, with 716,500 jobs (37%) located in the 33 centres. Between 2001 and 2006, 71,350 new jobs were created in Sydney, with 26,600 (37%) of these jobs in centres. The report also notes that employment growth was much higher between 1996 and 2001 than in the 2001 to 2006 period. Between 1996 and 2001 employment in centres grew by 13% and across the Sydney SD by 9%, whilst between 2001 and 2006 employment slowed to a growth rate of 4% for both employment centres and the Sydney SD.

Whilst the TDC report provides a great overview, further analysis based on centre locations shows that there are strong regional variations. In this post I will start with a snapshot of employment in 2006. Before we start, a word of warning: the following figures which have been derived from this TDC report should be viewed with some caution. There is a significant degree of undercounting and failure to answer census questions specifically related to employment. For example, we don’t know where around 6% of the Sydney workforce works and another 4% have no fixed location. I have left these “location unknown” workers out of most of the following statistics.

Another complication is that changes between the 2001 and 2006 censuses which make it difficult to compare them. For example, the TDC report notes that 2006 journey to work data uses place of usual residence, while previous in years the place of enumeration was used for home location and trip origin.

In addition, I have used LGA-level data from another TDC journey to work table, which has slightly different employment totals to those in the centres report. Also, whilst the TDC centres are based on those in the Metropolitan Strategy, the data is not directly comparable to the figures in the Metro document. Above all, this material does not take into account the impact of the many changes that have occurred since 2006, including the global financial crisis. All this means that the following analysis should be seen as a guide and no responsibility is taken for its accuracy.

With the warnings out of the way, let’s have a look at the stats. Eastern Sydney obviously has the majority of employment and the majority of centres as defined by the TDC – 20, compared to 13 in Western Sydney. Of the people employed in centres, only 21% work in Greater Western Sydney (GWS) Within eastern Sydney (for these purposes, the area covered by the rest of the councils in the Sydney Statistical Division but outside the GWS region), over 230,000 people are employed in the CBD alone.

In fact, the CBD accounts for 12% of Sydney’s total employment – this makes up nearly a third of all of Sydney’s centres-based employment and over 20% of eastern Sydney’s jobs. Almost another 30% of eastern Sydney jobs are in other centres, which means that just under half the east’s employment is centre-based (table 1).

TABLE 1: SYDNEY EMPLOYMENT BY LOCATION, 2006 – Eastern Sydney and Western Sydney

Source: based on NSW Transport Data Centre data

*  Eastern Sydney – all Sydney LGAs outside Greater Western Sydney

** Western Sydney – the 14 LGAs comprising Greater Western Sydney

#  Not in centres totals based on TDC LGA employment tables

The story in Western Sydney is very different. Employment is much more dispersed – only just over a quarter of the region’s centre-based jobs are in TDC-defined centres and no one centre dominates. Parramatta, with just over 34,000 jobs, is Western Sydney’s biggest employment centre but accounts for under 6% of the region’s employment, with 19.6% of the region’s jobs located in other centres (table 2 and graph 1).

TABLE 2: SYDNEY EMPLOYMENT BY REGION SUMMARY, 2006

Source: based on NSW Transport Data Centre data

 * Eastern Sydney – all Sydney LGAs outside Greater Western Sydney

** Western Sydney – the 14 LGAs comprising Greater Western Sydney

#  Not in centres totals based on TDC LGA employment tables

Graph 1:

In my next post I’ll look at changes in employment centres from 2001 to 2006.