Well, it’s out. The final report of the Sydney Morning Herald’s Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport, chaired by Mr Ron Christie, was published by the Herald earlier this week.

The report follows the release of the Preliminary Report in February which I discussed in a previous post. The final report covers the same broad themes as the earlier one and draws similar conclusions, but it also takes into account the submissions received in response to the preliminary report as well as public transport developments since its release.

In addition the Inquiry team, in which I participated, has refined the original report to sharpen its focus, in particular identifying 65 key recommendations. These are available as a stand-alone summary document from the Inquiry website, along with the full report.

Obviously I can’t summarise a document of over 520 pages in a single post (even the summary recommendation report is around 40 pages). I would however like to identify four key points that are emphasised in the final report. 

The first is the fundamental importance of the nexus between public transport governance, planning and funding. We have been all too successful, as the report observes, at preparing transport plans for Sydney, but hopeless at funding or implementing them. 

I used to say that if any of the six or seven public transport plans hatched in the past two decades or so had been implemented Sydney would be better off, but Sydney’s fragmented governance arrangements mean that as time goes on I’m not so sure. The lack of adequate public transport management has meant that these plans have increasingly become a patchwork of government project announcements, irrelevant to the city and community they were meant to serve (the CBD Metro debacle is an obvious example of this). 

Mr Christie’s transmittal letter summarises the basis of this nexus, which informs the rest of the report: 

The Inquiry believes that there is nothing more important or urgent than:

• Genuine reform of the way the planning and management of public transport takes place (”governance”)
• A long-term plan which is developed with real community input and has real certainty, backed by legislation, and
• Guaranteed, dedicated funding for implementing the plan.

Without all three of these legs of what the Inquiry calls the “Iron Triangle”, confidence in the way public transport is handled in Sydney will continue to erode.

The second point is the Inquiry’s comprehensive and innovative research into community attitudes to public transport, demonstrating not only a strong willingness to pay for public transport improvements but also establishing a set of parameters for the amount that the public are prepared to pay for these improvements. As Jarrett Walker (who also participated in the Inquiry) points out here, the Inquiry also succeeded in linking this package of potential funding increases to a systematic set of short-term and long-term improvements. 

As Jarrett notes, any attempts to introduce these increases and taxes in a vacuum would be a political disaster, but carefully linking them to such a package of well-considered improvements would be much more attractive to the general public. 

The third and related point which I think is well demonstrated in the final report is how much improvement can be made to Sydney’s public transport in the short term. The report does not shy away from identifying the major infrastructure projects which Sydney needs to implement and which have been so neglected for the past 30 or 40 years, but it also recognises that much can be done to improve public transport in the next five years before any of these major projects can be completed. 

Many of these improvements, such as improving train frequencies and running times or establishing a “frequent network” of bus services are relatively straightforward and could be achieved with relatively modest funding levels. The importance of these proposals is demonstrated by the fact that they make up nearly half the report’s recommendations. 

These recommendations are also instrumental in relation to the last point from the report that I want to highlight – the importance it places on developing Sydney’s public transport as a coherent, integrated network. This is not just an abstract objective – the Inquiry has given a lot of thought to how the various transport modes should be integrated through reforms of the fares and ticketing structure, improved service frequencies (which reduces waiting times at interchanges), improvements to interchanges themselves and, above all, a complete overhaul of transport governance arrangements. 

I’ll return to other elements of the  final report in future posts, but for now I would just like to thank the fellow members of the Inquiry team and in particular Ron Christie for his leadership and vision. As to “where to from here?” in relation to the report, I think the conclusion of his transmittal letter about what the public and transport stakeholders are seeking says it all: 

They want a public transport plan which will meet their needs both now and in the future, a plan whose components can and will be implemented and a plan which they will be willing to pay for because it will happen and because it will meet their needs. 

And they want our political leaders to listen, act and lead – and above all else, show some real foresight which transcends the electoral cycles.

On today’s ABC National’s Public Interest (Sunday 2 May), Dr Paul Mees, a well-known Melbourne-based transport expert,  makes one of the most eloquent summaries of the case for a better-planned, better-managed and better-connected public transport system that I have ever heard.

While I don’t agree with everything that Dr Mees has said or published on public transport, this interview canvasses a number of critical public transport issues and on most of these his position is very similar to the conclusions drawn by the Transport Public Inquiry in its preliminary report. The interview, which can be accessed here, is well worth a listen and hopefully the ABC will public the transcript soon.

A lot has happened since the SMH Transport Inquiry released its preliminary report in February. Shortly after its release the State Government announced that it was dumping the CBD and West Metros, aspects of which were criticised in the Inquiry – though the Metro’s demise was probably due to increasingly widespread criticism which predated the Inquiry. This has left a considerable bill of about $500 million for the early stages of constructing the CBD metro and for compensation to contractors and businesses.

The Government has also released the draft Metropolitan Transport Plan and a review of the Metropolitan Strategy for public comment (a process which itself was the subject of some controversy) and indicated that it intends to integrate the two plans in some way. While the Transport Plan proposes some projects which were also advocated in the Inquiry’s preliminary report, it falls well short of the latter’s detailed analysis and ignores many of its proposals for new infrastructure and improved services. The closing date for comment on the Government’s plans has been extended until 28 May.

The Government has also launched MyZone, a partial reform of Sydney’s arcane and complex fare structure, ahead of the introduction of electronic ticketing which is now scheduled to occur in 2012. MyZone reduces the number of train and bus fare bands and introduces a limited zone arrangement, but only a weekly or daily basis. Unfortunately it fails to address one of the key failings of the current fares structure – the transfer penalty public transport users face in Sydney when they change modes (I’ll make further comments on MyZone in a future post).

Meanwhile the Transport Public Inquiry is working to complete the final version of its report which will update the preliminary report and also consider the issues raised in submissions and discussions in response to the release of the preliminary report. The Inquiry, in which I have played a small part, hopes to have this work finished within a few weeks.

In my last post I outlined the governance arrangements outlined in the interim report of the Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport which I had a small role in developing. Now I’d like to summarise the Inquiry’s proposals for better public transport in Western Sydney contained in the report’s chapter on long-term development and expansion of the network. 

First, a brief summary of some of the underlying assumptions. The interim report incorporates the basic assumptions of the State Government’s Metropolitan Strategy but with a higher population growth, resulting in a “mid-range” Sydney population of 6 million by 2041. 

Based on this figure, the report outlines two specific scenarios to encourage debate regarding Sydney’s future – a “European” scenario, which is essentially a continuation of the Government’s Metropolitan Strategy, adapted to the higher growth levels but with additional greenfield development in Western Sydney and additional consolidation across most of the city. Employment would be similarly spread across major centres. 

The alternative “East Asian” scenario has the same population targets but focuses on more employment growth in the CBD and inner city, combined with high levels of residential development concentrated along the proposed metro lines radiating from the CBD. This scenario is major departure from the Metropolitan Strategy but is the logical outcome of the government’s current commitment to the development of a metro network. 

For the purposes of developing the scenarios, the Inquiry has assumed similar constraints in both options, based on the community’s willingness to pay and the economy’s capacity to afford public transport infrastructure over the next 30 years. This amounts to a total, in current dollars, of around $36 billion. 

Based on these constraints and a range of other assumptions, a range of infrastructure projects was assumed for each scenario, as summarised in the following table. I have added an indication of which projects are located in or directly benefit Greater Western Sydney. 

Y* counted as a Western Sydney project because it services part of the region

Derived from table 2.10 in the Independent Public Inquiry interim report

The proposed public transport infrastructure to be constructed between 2014 and 2030 is also shown in the following maps of each scenario (source: Independent Public Inquiry interim report chapter 2 - click on each map to show full size):

 Some the project proposals such as the North West and South West Rail Links and the West Metro are common to both scenarios, but most of the other projects fall largely or wholly under either one or the other of the two models.  

In the above table the cost of the Western Metro has been included as a Western Sydney project in both scenarios because it services parts of the Parramatta, Auburn and Holroyd Council areas, even though the bulk of the route would be outside Western Sydney. With this qualification in mind, the European scenario assumes a much higher level of expenditure in Greater Western Sydney, reflecting the population and employment distributions which are both more dispersed than in the East Asian scenario.

Not only does the European scenario require more rail infrastructure in Western Sydney, but also greater investment in the region in light rail, busways and even motorways. If the Western Metro is discounted the difference between the two scenarios is even greater – $17.5 billion for Western Sydney projects in the European scenario as opposed to only $7.25 billion under the East Asian model. 

While the Inquiry notes that both scenarios would provide significant benefits in terms accommodating Sydney’s population growth and job shifts as well as the forecast increase in public transport trips, the importance of providing some degree of equity for the residents of Western Sydney was an important factor in the decision to favour the European scenario. To quote the interim report: 

The main difference between the scenarios would lie in their relative provisions for western and eastern Sydney and the equity of access provided. In this respect the “European” scenario would be superior. 

Because the “European” scenario’s proposed projects include an extra heavy rail crossing of the harbour, they would cater better for potential high-speed rail services from north of Sydney in the future. 

Similarly, because the “European” scenario’s proposed projects include an extension of the North West Rail line to link with the Richmond line, they would provide better access to the Richmond air force base if this were developed as an “overflow” airport for Sydney.

It is important to reiterate that these scenarios are presented for discussion only and neither necessarily reflects current government policy; for example, while the South West Rail Link has recently been re-announced by the State Government, the future of the North West link is still in limbo. What is implicit in the interim report is the real danger that if the government does proceed with prioritising the construction of an expensive metro network, no further infrastructure is likely to be provided in Western Sydney beyond the South West Rail Link and the Western Metro for many decades to come – if ever. 

Further, the considered approach to funding these improvements adopted in the report also means that their construction would have to be staged over a 30-year period, though even this rate of construction would be a considerable improvement over what has been done to date. In the short term, much would depend on the roll-out of the “Frequent Rapid” and “Frequent Local” bus services proposed as part of the Inquiry’s “Frequent Network” initiative which I will discuss in a further post.

It’s finally out – the interim report of the Independent Public Inquiry into Sydney’s public transport. 

The Inquiry’s report was prepared under the guidance of Mr Ron Christie, former NSW Coordinator General for Rail and former head of the RTA, who famously got the trains (and buses) to run on time during the 2000 Olympics. The inquiry was established and resourced by the Sydney Morning Herald, but was conducted on a completely independent basis. 

I felt honoured to be part of a team of transport advisers and planners who spent four months working with Mr Christie to develop the report, based on nearly 500 public submissions, meetings with key experts, detailed research into community attitudes and financial options, team members’ professional experience and expertise and, not surprisingly, robust debate within the team itself. 

I assisted in developing the governance section of the report. I also contributed to the overall debate, especially in raising social equity issues and the importance of looking at public transport provision in outer suburban areas, but the report is really a collaborative team effort. 

The result is a document which is far more comprehensive than any other transport planning initiative for Sydney I’ve seen in over a decade and which is also much more evidence-based than most transport plans. The report has six sections, starting off with what Sydneysiders actually said to the Inquiry about their own priorities for fixing the transport system, and perhaps more importantly the outcomes of an independent survey which clearly demonstrated their desire for change and willingness to pay for these improvements. 

Based on these responses, the rest of the 450-page report is divided into chapters on the long-term development of the transport network, fixing fares, short-term improvements, funding and finance and the chapter I contributed to, “Getting it done”. The recommendations based on these chapters are divided into nine, almost self-explanatory key themes, as follows: 

1. We have tried the ‘do nothing’ option for public transport. It has failed

2. We need a complete public transport network plan—and an agency that can deliver it

3. The three-legged stool: urban form, pricing and transport

4. Public transport, not just roads

5. A single, seamless public transport network

6. Cost-effectiveness

7. Short-term urgency and continuous improvement

8. Long-term commitment, now

9. Leadership and transparency for hard choices

I won’t try to summarise the report, because that has been done within the report itself as well as by the Sydney Morning Herald and by Mr Jarrett Walker, one of the team members. I would like however to talk about the two areas I was most involved in – governance, and the identification of transport priorities in Western Sydney. 

The governance section, “Getting it done”, was described by Mr Christie at the launch as being possibly the most important chapter in the interim report. To quote from the report: 

No matter how visionary a transport plan may be, it will succeed only if it is supported by a strong management structure committed to its long-term implementation.

This management structure, or “governance” system, must be:

• Able to secure the resources required to deliver the infrastructure underpinning the plan
• Strong enough to maintain a commitment to the plan in the face of short-­term political considerations
• Able to manage the whole public transport system cohesively and with authority
• Able to obtain enough funding to deliver a high level of services, and
• Be prepared to champion public transport and other sustainable modes in the face of competing priorities and interests, such as the demands of private vehicles.

If the governance system is inadequate the public transport plan is most unlikely to be delivered. Critical infrastructure will not be built, services will be poorly integrated and the level of service provision will remain patchy and unreliable.

The governance section outlines the fragmented nature of Sydney’s current transport management. It compares this state of affairs to overseas and interstate experience, especially systems that operate successfully in places such as Perth, London, Singapore, Vancouver and Zurich. It also summarises proposals regarding governance expressed in many of the submissions received by the inquiry. 

The overwhelming conclusion is that to have any success in overcoming its current “silo” based management and ad hoc planning, Sydney must adopt a single new authority to plan, develop and manage all public transport in Sydney. This authority must be responsible for most activities relating to public transport provision, including: 

•  long-term public transport planning
• defining public transport fare structures and fare setting
• implementing integrated fares and ticketing
• specifying routes, timetables and minimum acceptable performance standards for transport operators
• contracting for the provision of these services
• providing network information
• marketing and promotion of public transport services

The governance chapter also discusses the options for creating such an authority, including reforming the current structure or creating a new tier of governance (similar to the Mayor for London and the Portland Metro Council). It recommends a third option – the creation of an independent public transport coordination authority, called Transport for Sydney (TfS).

This body would undertake all the functions outlined above. The TfS would be managed by an independent Board with members from the State, Federal and local government and persons with experience in the transport sector, business, marketing and transport advocacy. A small secretariat, answerable to the Board, would manage Sydney’s transport through the following sections: 

• Plan Process, responsible for developing and reviewing the Public Transport Network Plan for Sydney and conducting public consultations.
• Infrastructure Development, responsible for the purchase (on a contestable basis) and project management of the design, construction and delivery of public transport infrastructure, plus the specification and setting of standards for all new rolling stock.
• Operations, the core of TfS, which would be responsible for the development and sale of integrated journeys to the community and the coordinated purchase of these improved and expanded public transport services, on a contestable basis, from transport operators.
• Budget and Government, responsible for financial management, funding negotiations and TfS’s relationships with State, Commonwealth and local governments in support of the Public Transport Network Plan.

Transport for Sydney governance model (click to see full size) from the Independent Public Inquiry interim report

The report goes on to discuss the relationships the proposed authority should have with state government agencies, the federal government and councils, as well as the role of an independent customer advocate and of consultation in the plan development process.

The Inquiry has proposed that the new authority prepare an initial plan for public comment and that subsequently drafts of the plan should be released nine months before every state election, thus providing additional scrutiny of the plan and the responses of the parties and politicians in the run-up to the election. As the report states: 

This four-yearly revision process, tied to the four-yearly electoral cycle, would present a major opportunity for the public, the government, the opposition political parties and individual electoral candidates to shape the policies and priorities of the transport authority.

The plan would then be finalised and adopted within 12 months of the election and would be protected by legislation against political interference outside of the plan adoption process outlined above.

The governance model proposed in the Inquiry’s interim report represents a clear break with the Sydney’s current complex and largely dysfunctional management processes. The primary intention is to greatly improve the planning and delivery of public transport in Sydney. In doing so, the model would remove many of the detailed aspects of transport administration from political control and interference, limiting the role of politicians to setting the broad directions of transport policy through the adoption of the four-year plan.

It is likely that this aspect of the proposed changes will meet the greatest political resistance, though, ironically, politicians stand to gain from being able to put day-to-day operational problems at arms length. Whether any or, ideally, all of the major parties have the courage to adopt the Transport for Sydney model remains to be seen.

In my next post I will look at Inquiry’s proposals for better public transport in Western Sydney.

In November the 2009 State of Australian Cities Conference brought together academics, researchers, planners and many others involved in urban design and management at the University of Western Australia in Perth to discuss the current status and direction of our cities.

After opening addresses by the WA minister for planning and the shadow minister for regional development, over 120 papers were presented across six themes: Economy, Environmental, Governance, Health, Infrastructure and Social. The presentations were diverse and occasionally controversial, but taken together they present a fascinating and detailed snapshot of the shape or cities are in.

My paper was titled: How the west was lost – the causes and consequences of under-investment in Western Sydney’s infrastructure and was, not surprisingly, in the infrastructure stream. It highlighted how unlike other Australian and overseas cities, Sydney had failed to reverse the post-war pattern of under-investment in rail infrastructure to deal with continued population growth, particularly in Western Sydney, whilst making significant expenditure in motorways.

The paper also discussed how factors such as the pattern of development of Sydney’s infrastructure prior to the 1950s, its post-war pattern of growth, the current political and economic environment and continuing resistance in some quarters to investment in public transport had contributed to this situation, as well as the potential consequences for Sydney’s future. A copy of the paper can be downloaded here and other conference papers should be available online shortly.

Perth skyline across the river

Well, it’s inevitable that the next few posts will be dominated by Sydney public transport and planning issues. On Tuesday the public hearings for the Sydney Morning Herald’s independent public inquiry headed by transport expert and former Director-General Ron Christie kicked off with a meeting in Castle Hill. 

It’s fitting that the hearings started in the north-west, an area that is starved of public transport and which also seems to be continually short-changed by governments. Around eight hearings are being held through September and October, leading up to the deadline for submissions to the inquiry on 8^th October 2009. 

I would encourage everyone with an interest in Sydney’s future to attend a hearing and to make a submission. Ultimately the inquiry isn’t just about transport, but also and more importantly about how the decisions we make about transport will impact on the sort of future this city will have (go to http://www.transportpublicinquiry.com.au/ for more details about the hearings and the inquiry process). 

The Castle Hill meeting was well-attended and it was interesting how many of the audience had clearlyy read Garry Glazebrook’s  A 30-year public transport plan for Sydney, which is one of the references cited by the transport inquiry. This lead to a lot of questions regarding the respective virtues and deficiencies of metros, single-deck trains and double-deckers. 

Fortunately there was also a range of comments on other topics, including the importance of cross-regional transport between the northwest and the southwest, as well as the frustrations imposed by the almost complete lack of rail transport in the region. Not surprisingly this meant there was little feedback on issues such as the state of services on the current system, which will certainly feature more strongly in the hearings in those areas which actually have trains. 

I have just had a paper accepted for the State of Australian Cities conference to be held in Perth in November which looks at Sydney’s pattern of development and provision of public transport infrastructure – and the lack thereof in Western Sydney (click here for further information about the SOAC conference). I’ll talk a bit more about the issues I explore in this paper in future posts, as well as sharing some of the ideas I am thinking of raising in my submission to the inquiry.

Melbourne-based firm .id (informed decisions) have just launched economy.id, an online economic profile to “describe, explore and promote” local economies.

economy.id joins the .id stable of profiles and other web-based programs, including profile.id, atlas.id, forecast.id and housing.id. .id’s main client base is local government, with over 180 councils and regional organisations of councils across Australia using one or more .id product. However the beneficiaries of economy.id and the company’s other products are not just councillors and local government staff, as most councils also make these products available online for local residents, businesses, community organisations and others to use (click here for an overview of .id’s products).

economy.id (which so far can be viewed for Penrith City Council in NSW, the City of Monash in Victoria and the City of Joondalup in WA) has a deceptively simple structure. It sets out to answer questions in two key sections called “our economy”, focused on economic characteristics and performance and “our resources”, which concentrates on profiling the resident workforce as well as the labour force and key local infrastructure.

The questions include, for example, “what is the size of the local economy?”, “how is the local economy performing?” and “what are the local labour force characteristics?”. These questions economy.id attempts to answer through a series of accessible tables, graphs and thematic maps – and whilst the focus is on the local, most tables and graphs provide comparisons to relevant metropolitan and state level benchmarks.

Like the company’s other products, economy.id is hosted on the .id server, but councils and other clients can customise the profile’s appearance, incorporating their logos and linking it to their own websites. This approach is consistent with .id’s other products and the company has largely succeeded in maintaining a similar look and feel.

This belies the complexity involved in putting together a local economic profile, which has required the integration of a wide variety of data, including information from the census, national accounts, and other ABS data sources, DEEWR small area labour markets data and input-output modelling from REMPLAN. The latter is particularly significant for councils, providing accessible input-output modelling at the local level.

All this means that economy.id moves well beyond the parameters of .id’s “flagship” product, profile.id, which is mainly based on census data. Not surprisingly the costs are also higher, with an up-front charge of $35,000 and an annual fee of $7,500, the latter covering hosting the profile, regular updating as new data becomes available and a comprehensive training program. However, as a council staffer pointed out at the NSW launch, economy.id has the potential to deliver significant savings to councils in financial and staff resources.

Until now, councils interested in researching and analysing local economic performance have had to commission either academic researchers or private consultancy firms, usually on a one-off basis. Invariably this approach is very expensive and whilst the results can be and often are of a high standard, this has not always been the case. In addition the data produced has usually been static in nature and difficult to update, with limited community access, especially online.

economy.id succeeds in addressing these issues. It also provides a more consistent and higher standard of economic data available for use within council (ensuring, for example, that all reports to council use the same economic parameters and even the same graphs and tables) and in promoting the local area for investment. This information will also put councils in a much better position when negotiating with state government, federal government and the private sector.

This is not to say that economy.id is perfect. Ideally, some modules such as local infrastructure will be fleshed out with more material in future. In addition, the issues noted in the supporting information regarding data sources and quality need to be considered carefully. Whilst economy.id may not meet everyone’s requirements for local economic analysis but it will go a long way by providing a baseline of the best available and up-to-date economic data in a consistent and accessible format.

Whilst councils need to decide whether this product will meet their local needs (and, as with all web-based products, should always assess the relevant Web 2.0 risk factors discussed here), economy.id has the potential to provide great value for money. It will allow councils and others using economic information to redirect their resources away from basic number-crunching, formatting and presentation to more strategic analysis of the results.

Ultimately it will also provide a great local community resource. Local communities, businesses and organisations may well be the major beneficiaries, especially if enough councils across the country or even within a particular region adopt economy.id as their standard for local economic profiling and make it publicly available through their websites.

Disclaimer: whilst the author has no current relationship with .id, he was once involved in commissioning the company to prepare a regional profile based on the 2006 census.

For those who haven’t seen it yet, writer and playwright Louis Nowra’s latest essay “Who turned out the lights?” in the Weekend Australian Magazine is a pungent summary of Sydney’s major problems, their causes and the resulting social, cultural and economic impacts.

The beginning paragraphs are available on line from the Weekend Australian website, but to read the full article you will have to purchase the paper. To summarise Nowra, the confidence that Sydney developed in its successful handling of the Olympics has disappeared, to be replaced by apathy, incompetence and above all, a lack of vision. As he notes, however, many of these problems predate the Olympics – and it is hard to disagree with Nowra’s summary:

“Many of the tribulations affecting Sydney are due to the fact that for the past two decades governments have forgotten that a city is more than its CBD and trendy inner suburbs. Outer suburbs are also integral to a city’s energy and sense of itself. But by the end of the millennium these suburbs, especially in the southwest and northwest, were fraying badly.”

Whilst his subsequent depiction of outer Western Sydney as being awash with “drugs, domestic violence and family breakdown” may be too sweeping a generalisation, there is no escaping the fact that parts of the region suffer from these problems and that complacency and policy failures by successive governments have contributed to this situation.

Nowra goes on to list some specific examples and their consequences. These start with under-investment in transport and other infrastructure (here Nowra takes a swipe at the decision to replace the northwest and southwest rail links with the CBD Metro), but also include inattention to a lagging economy, poor urban design, inept licensing laws and the collapse of the health system.

You might not agree with every one of Nowra’s arguments, but overall he builds a strong case for his conviction that Sydney has “outgrown the imagination of its politicians”. He concludes that to succeed Sydney needs to reinvest not only in infrastructure, but also in some less tangible factors such as pride, youthful enthusiasm, cultural exuberance and social diversity in order to create a “melting pot of ideas and a sense of purpose” to overcome the city’s current “malaise of apathy and cynicism”.

It would be very easy to dismiss Nowra’s criticisms as merely another polemic against the current State Government, but his critique is much more far-reaching. It should be compulsory reading for politicians on all sides, in Federal as well as State politics.

Well, I said that I would outline some of the so-called “shovel ready” alternative transport projects the NSW Government could have nominated for Infrastructure Australia funding instead of the less-than-shovel-ready metro proposals that were put up. However, a lot has happened regarding transport – or at least a lot has been said about transport – since my last post.

I’ll come back to discuss “shovel-readiness” in a moment, but first to recap the past two weeks’ events. First, Dr Garry Glazebrook (UTS) released a detailed report which outlines a radically different approach to planning Sydney’s transport future. Glazebrook’s report proposes a metro system, but one quite different from that proposed by the Government, along with an upgraded heavy-rail system, light rail and a set of bus ring-routes. This is an oversimplification of a comprehensive plan, which I’ll return to in a future post.

Second, almost out of nowhere, light rail has been put back on the table by the Minster for Transport, David Campbell, who is said to have been won to the cause by seeing light rail systems in France.

Not surprisingly his initial enthusiasm to extend the line to Dulwich Hill and possibly into the CBD has run into resistance within Government (not to mention comparisons in the media with the vastly more expensive Metro), but the proposal is still being considered. Yet another feasibility study will be conducted and today the Sydney Morning Herald is reporting that inner city councils have agreed to “call the state’s bluff” by agreeing to the Government’s demand that they contribute to the cost of the study.

Campbell’s conversion to light rail apparently occurred after seeing systems in Paris and Nice, which is interesting given their nature. The Paris system comprises a set of four disconnected lines in the outskirts of the city. Like the Sydney light rail, some sections of the system have been converted from former rail lines, but they operate much more as feeders servicing the termini of Paris metro lines and other outer suburban areas.

The Nice system serves the coastal city of Nice, with a population of 350,000; the closest equivalent here in population would be Newcastle. In terms of a planned transport system, the Gold Coast light rail proposal which made up most of Queensland’s successful bid for Federal Government infrastructure funding would probably be the most similar.

Which brings us to the projects that the NSW Government could have put up for Infrastructure Australia funding. These include the North West Rail Link, probably the most expensive but arguably the most important of the cancelled/deferred rail lines. I suspect that the original heavy rail plan, to run from Epping to Rouse Hill, rather than the short-lived NW metro iteration would be the most viable option. The Epping-Rouse Hill section has also passed through all the environmental and planning hoops and could be easily integrated with the Epping to Chatswood line.

Similarly the planning for South West Rail Link is also complete. There is however a question about the timing of this project, given the economic downturn and the slowing in the rate of residential development. The third potential project, the Parramatta to Epping rail link is also a priority for the region and would make a major contribution to reinforcing the role of Parramatta, but some of the original environmental impact assessment and subsequent approvals may have to be updated.

Whilst my personal preference is for the North West Rail Link, any of these projects would have done more to meet Sydney’s transport needs than the proposed Metros, especially the CBD metro. Yes, the capacity problems in the CBD need to be addressed, but it is far from clear that the CBD metro in its current form will really address this issue – and the heavy rail projects are all a lot more shovel-ready!