The former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone’s recent City of Sydney CityTalk address contained a strong argument for greater investment in education, infrastructure and sustainable transport to tackle climate change, but he made another  important comment on city management  in the Q&A session afterwards. As a result it did not appear in the published version of his talk and has therefore not received the attention it deserves. 

Livingstone was musing how his position as a popularly elected mayor contributed to his sweeping reforms of planning, public transport and other areas of service delivery in the UK capital. He noted that the extensive powers devolved by the UK government  in setting up the position certainly helped, but another key factor was the way in which the position had been structured. 

He observed that as a member of the British Labour Party he had spent most of his political life making deals “inside the building” as he put it, within the party room and caucus, both inevitable features of the Westminster system and very similar to their counterparts at the state and federal levels in Australia. 

Livingstone pointed out that the reinstated and radically reformed position – in effect the creation of a directly elected executive mayor – had forced him to look “outside the building” for the first time. 

He had been required to negotiate and build alliances directly with organisations and structures that were not necessarily part of the political system, as well as with the wider community, to build support for his policies. Livingstone concluded that this aspect of accountability contributed to making a directly-elected mayor an ideal city manager. 

The initial reaction among many in the audience after his address was admiration for the results Livingstone had achieved mixed with an almost-universal attitude of “obviously it’ll never happen here”. This is due to the remote prospect of any Australian state government creating a directly-elected metropolitan-wide position that could be seen as a competitor. 

However, Livingstone’s perspective is still food for thought. With the partial experience of Brisbane, no major Australian city has a single entity, elected or not, with sole responsibility for city management, in particular around key planning and transport issues. Most of the key decisions are still made not only within state governments, but firmly “inside the building”. 

The apparent success of Livingstone’s London “experiment” should make state governments and councils in Australia look outside their own buildings a bit more, to reassess their perspectives on urban management and consider experimenting with different forms of more direct and accountable metropolitan governance.

Well, I said that I would outline some of the so-called “shovel ready” alternative transport projects the NSW Government could have nominated for Infrastructure Australia funding instead of the less-than-shovel-ready metro proposals that were put up. However, a lot has happened regarding transport – or at least a lot has been said about transport – since my last post.

I’ll come back to discuss “shovel-readiness” in a moment, but first to recap the past two weeks’ events. First, Dr Garry Glazebrook (UTS) released a detailed report which outlines a radically different approach to planning Sydney’s transport future. Glazebrook’s report proposes a metro system, but one quite different from that proposed by the Government, along with an upgraded heavy-rail system, light rail and a set of bus ring-routes. This is an oversimplification of a comprehensive plan, which I’ll return to in a future post.

Second, almost out of nowhere, light rail has been put back on the table by the Minster for Transport, David Campbell, who is said to have been won to the cause by seeing light rail systems in France.

Not surprisingly his initial enthusiasm to extend the line to Dulwich Hill and possibly into the CBD has run into resistance within Government (not to mention comparisons in the media with the vastly more expensive Metro), but the proposal is still being considered. Yet another feasibility study will be conducted and today the Sydney Morning Herald is reporting that inner city councils have agreed to “call the state’s bluff” by agreeing to the Government’s demand that they contribute to the cost of the study.

Campbell’s conversion to light rail apparently occurred after seeing systems in Paris and Nice, which is interesting given their nature. The Paris system comprises a set of four disconnected lines in the outskirts of the city. Like the Sydney light rail, some sections of the system have been converted from former rail lines, but they operate much more as feeders servicing the termini of Paris metro lines and other outer suburban areas.

The Nice system serves the coastal city of Nice, with a population of 350,000; the closest equivalent here in population would be Newcastle. In terms of a planned transport system, the Gold Coast light rail proposal which made up most of Queensland’s successful bid for Federal Government infrastructure funding would probably be the most similar.

Which brings us to the projects that the NSW Government could have put up for Infrastructure Australia funding. These include the North West Rail Link, probably the most expensive but arguably the most important of the cancelled/deferred rail lines. I suspect that the original heavy rail plan, to run from Epping to Rouse Hill, rather than the short-lived NW metro iteration would be the most viable option. The Epping-Rouse Hill section has also passed through all the environmental and planning hoops and could be easily integrated with the Epping to Chatswood line.

Similarly the planning for South West Rail Link is also complete. There is however a question about the timing of this project, given the economic downturn and the slowing in the rate of residential development. The third potential project, the Parramatta to Epping rail link is also a priority for the region and would make a major contribution to reinforcing the role of Parramatta, but some of the original environmental impact assessment and subsequent approvals may have to be updated.

Whilst my personal preference is for the North West Rail Link, any of these projects would have done more to meet Sydney’s transport needs than the proposed Metros, especially the CBD metro. Yes, the capacity problems in the CBD need to be addressed, but it is far from clear that the CBD metro in its current form will really address this issue – and the heavy rail projects are all a lot more shovel-ready!

My last post discussed how NSW had fared relative to the other states in attracting transport infrastructure funding, particularly for public transport, in this week’s federal budget – which, in summary, was not very well.

 It’s useful to look at the five public transport projects which did receive substantial funding to see what characteristics they have in common. First cab off the rank and the project to receive by far the biggest allocation was the Regional Rail Express, which will provide a 40 kilometre link from West Werribee on the Geelong line to Southern Cross Station in Melbourne, joining the Baccus Marsh line near Ravenhall.

According the Federal Government, it will segregate V/Line regional rail services from metropolitan rail services allowing regional trains from Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo avoid being delayed by suburban trains. It will also provide additional capacity for suburban services from Werribee, Sunbury and Craigeburn in the western growth corridor, delivering capacity for an extra 9,000 passengers in peak hour. 

The next largest public transport project is the 13 kilometre first stage of a light rail system on the Gold Coast, running from the Gold Coast campus of Griffith University to Broadbeach via Southport, which will receive $365 million. Further investment will be provided by State and Local Governments and the private sector with the line ultimately linking to the heavy rail network at Helensvale in the north and extending south to Coolangatta. The Federal Government comments that when completed this project will remove up to 40,000 cars from the road network. 

The next two largest projects are both located in Adelaide. The 42 km Gawler line to the city’s north will receive $294 million for resleepering and electrification to improve services, whilst the Noarlunga line receives $291 million for a 5.5 kilometre extension south to Seaford. Both projects complement SA Government plans to modernise Adelaide’s rail network. The final “big five” project is a $236 million investment to sink the central city section of the Perth to Freemantle rail line, releasing 50,000 sq metres of land for urban redevelopment.

There is quite a step down to the final four projects worth under $100 million each. One of these involves direct capital works – the O-bahn track extension in Adelaide, which receives $61 million for a 4.5 km link from the existing terminus to the CBD. The other three involve preconstruction works or feasibility studies for inner-city rail proposals, with the Sydney West Metro receiving $91 million, the East-West Rail Tunnel $40 million and the Brisbane Inner City Rail feasibility study $20 million.

A few things become clear from this analysis. First, the Federal Government appears to have prioritised well thought out projects providing extensions or improvements to existing heavy rail services that link to outer suburban growth areas, such the western growth corridor in Melbourne and the southern and northern suburbs in Adelaide. It is also prepared to invest substantially in new projects in outer suburban areas such as the Gold Coast light rail. 

Second, where it has funded these projects it has done so substantially and obviously with a view that they will be delivered comparatively quickly. The top five projects received enough funding to complete major stages of work and to be in operation within five or six years. 

Third, the Federal Government does not seem inclined to throw large sums of money at the inner city metro and other rail projects put forward by the various State Governments, especially if they are not shovel ready. The only inner city project to receive substantial funding was the undergrounding of the east-west rail line in Perth – and it can be argued that the (former) WA Government had already wisely invested some of the proceeds of the (former) mining boom in building two complete new rail lines to outer suburban areas in the north and south of the city. 

This caution reflects the view put by IA in its Report to the Council of Australian Governments in December 2008 regarding metro and other “new technology” transport proposals. This is worth quoting in full:

The strategic policy choice facing Australian governments is whether, and under what circumstances, new urban rail systems should adopt such technologies. However, a move towards these technologies raises many issues. To avoid a repetition of the rail gauge problem from the nineteenth century, decisions on these matters need to be made with national input and intergovernmental collaboration. The network that exists today represents more than 40 years of consistent long term planning and investment. An equivalent national commitment to such planning and investment is required in Australia if new technologies are to be applied to the public transport sector.

However, even if a decision is taken to make such a strategic shift, the existing rail networks will be a fundamental part of Australia’s urban transport networks for decades to come. Sensible investment in the capacity of those systems and in life-cycle replacement of assets will continue to be required.

In seeking Federal funding, NSW chose to put all its public transport eggs in two very big baskets– the CBD Metro and the Sydney West Metro – and received only $91 million towards preconstruction works for the latter. Clearly, neither project was assessed as being ready enough to meet IA’s criteria, nor indeed do they reflect the Federal Government’s predisposition (no doubt influenced by the IA perspective quoted above) to fund projects in outer urban areas mostly based on the “old technologies”.

The irony is that NSW did have three shovel-ready projects that met IA’s criteria but did not put them forward. I’ll consider these and some of Sydney’s strategic transport planning issues in my next post.

Much has been said in the media and elsewhere about the shortfall in the Federal Budget infrastructure allocations for NSW transport projects, but it is worthwhile examining its dimensions in more detail.

Just how much (or little) will NSW receive? There are a few ways to look at this – relative to the allocations to other states, relative to population (or some other measure of demand) and relative to the total value of the project proposals lodged by the State Government.

In summary, NSW will receive $2.1 billion for two “shovel-ready” road projects and preliminary works for a single public transport project. By far the largest portion goes to the Hunter Expressway between the F3 and Branxston, which receives $1.5 billion. The Pacific Highway Kempsey Bypass has been allocated $618 million and the proposed Western Metro will receive only $91 million for “pre-construction work”.

Even with the substantial roads allocation, NSW is underweight compared to the other states, receiving only 25% of the total transport allocation (see graph 1). Victoria is the clear winner with 38% of the funding.

Take out the roads allocation and the picture is even more stark. Of the five states to receive public transport funding, NSW has the lowest allocation at just 2%, whilst Victoria receives a whopping 71% of the total public transport budget vote (graph 2). Whilst public transport related projects receive nearly 55% of the national transport infrastructure allocation, in NSW the proportion is only 4.6%.

On a per-head basis (using 2008 population figures), NSW receives just under $13 per resident, whilst the average across the five States to receive public transport funding is $225.80. Victoria will receive $611.39 per head (graph 3).

The most interesting comparison is with the total projects submitted for consideration by Infrastructure Australia. Now, it is unlikely that any State Government would have expected a Federal contribution to every project on its wish list, nor would they have expected any projects that did attract Federal support to be funded in full. It is also hard to get an exact figure for the total allocations sought by each State given the “blue sky” nature of some of the figures supplied, but however you look at it NSW has done extremely poorly.

Just 1% of the total value of NSW public transport project proposals submitted to Infrastructure Australia has been funded, compared with around 19% in South Australia, 43% in Victoria and 90% in Western Australia.

Queensland received only 2% of the total value of its public transport wish list, but that state’s figure was inflated by the $14 billion estimated cost of the Brisbane metro proposals. Queensland’s allocation of $385 million was actually four tines the amount NSW received and will enable the construction of the Gold Coast Light Rail project to commence.

What does this tell us? First, that the Feds appear to have been interested in funding only genuinely “shovel-ready” projects that meet all the IA criteria, at least in this round. The successful projects also address major transport needs as part of a coherent transport strategy and, significantly, there has been an emphasis on extending and improving rail services in outer suburban areas. In my next post I will examine some of the individual public transport projects that were funded and the conclusions that can be drawn from these allocations.